Sunday, September 30, 2007
Constant Change
Friday, September 28, 2007
Precedents in IR
Breaking precedent can also have an impact on international institutions. Through precedents, a single country can give an institution more or less power. For example, when the United States attacked Iraq, even though the UN did not approve of it, the US took power away from the United Nations.
US identity
One interesting application of this theory would be towards the identity of the US. Since the end of WWII, the US has been a hegemonic power. It is evident, however, that the US might not be able to maintain that identity much longer. International popularity for our government is in a steady decline, and other international or multi-national organizations are gaining political weight. If one of the main US interests has always been to maintain order in a supreme position (thereby making it a sort of international policing power), will these interests persist in the shifting international environment? Can they persist when our relationships with so many foreign countries have been tainted? It will be interesting to see how the identity of the US will reshape itself in this situation.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Reflection on class 9.27
Relational Constructivism and 9.11
In hindsight, it is easy to apply this theory to the actions undertaken by the Bush administration in the post-9/11 world. Bush’s team gave reasons for attacking the Taliban in Afghanistan- they allowed a terrorist regime to hide in the mountains and prepare their next unprovoked attack against “Western” nations. The administration stressed that this military action was not an attack against Muslims but on Islamic Extremists who sought to invoke terror on the free world. News media became a pulpit; it was extensively used to convey the necessity of action. They garnered international support in order to demonstrate the international community’s support against terrorism . The administration criticized other options- if you did not support the war effort in Afghanistan, you were viewed as unpatriotic and weak for not wanting to stop extremism. Blame was placed on other regimes; it did not matter that U.S. intelligence, the FAA, the Clinton Administration, the military etc. had failed to protect American lives by preventing the attack.
Although I do not believe this theory has all the answers, I do believe that relational constructivism sheds an interesting light on IR theory. I believe that the legitimacy aspect of this perspective does play a large role in state actions.
Constructivism
Jackson also addresses the concept of rationality. I mentioned in an earlier post that what is rational can really be subjective, since actions can be in line with certain values (and therefore rational in the eyes of those with similar values) but irrational for those that hold different values. Jackson uses the concept of legitimation to reiterate this. The same action can be explained in various ways, but one of those explanations will legitimate the action so that it is acceptable and "rational" in the eyes of another actor.
Jackson also refers to legitimation struggles as a "war of words," giving this process a very superficial sense. Simple words cannot be seen as concrete evidence of reason for action. This is similar to Morgenthau's dismissal of motive for lack of certainty; he claimed that there is no way to determine the truthfulness of a stated motive. Through a constructivist argument, however, this actually can be useful because what matters is the way actions are perceived. In reality, perception is the basis for the formation of identity and relationships.
Although this theory may prove prediction of action slightly more difficult, I find it more applicable to reality than the other theories we've studied.
"Anarchy is thick" [Yoo, Week 5, Dialogue]
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Jackson Article
This is why I like the contructivist model the best of what we have learned so far. It doesn't just assume state action, but backs it up with a human component as well. Jackson's article seems to me to do a good job of explaining a theory that seems to be closer to how I view the international system than anything else set forward so far.
Relational Constructivism
Constructivism seems to be contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. Jackson states, “…A relational constructivist approach enables analysts to focus on how questions of authority and legitimacy are negotiated in practice.” While the words of leaders are extremely important in swaying the bias of a state, I still feel that the old saying is truer, that actions speak louder than words. Sometimes it seems that today the only thing that those in charge do is talk. It even seems that way when we look at the other “isms” that we already went over; they continually talk of a need for world peace, but yet they really don’t put forth an idea for action toward such a future.
Jackson and Rhetoric
Jackson argues that "rhetorical commonplaces" are actually one for the two ways that agency is preserved. Different rhetoric is used for different parties. Jackson then discusses that "nesting: bombing in the name of civilized humanity" is a strategy to act abroad in a way that abuses traditional state sovereignty. "Nesting" is thus another way of using rhetoric in order to achieve a certain goal. Jackson concludes the chapter saying "actions are caused by the specific configuration of rhetorical resources brought to bear at a given point in time."
This argument implies that actors in the international system are going to act as they want, and that these actors will achieve "legitimation" through rhetoric. Even those who abide by a more realist philosophy use rhetoric in order to accomplish goals. Just like rhetoric was used to legitimize bombing Serbia, which was considered a purely humanitarian cause, rhetoric was used by President Bush when he wanted to invade Iraq. His rhetoric alienated the international community, but it also put Congress and US citizens behind the war, at least temporarily. One could also argue that the world may perceive the United States very differently if it was more cautious about the rhetoric it used in the international community.
Friday, September 21, 2007
Thoughts on Nuclear Weapons [Yoo, Week 4, Dialogue]
class discussion response
Class Discussion, 9/20
Not that the state is obsolete yet, but what may be are the theories we have learned in class. Realism, functionalism, neo-whatever may be an appropriate guide to show how to react to other states, but not terrorists groups. If a nuclear attack occurs, these people will simply retreat back into hiding and countries can't have any response. Invade and bomb a sovreign nation like Pakistan, which supports the War on Terror because someone chose to take up refuge in their unpolicable mountain range? I believe that while the theories we've learned are still partially relevant in today's world, many of them lack the forsight to see into today's modern, globalized world.
Religious Wars
Thursday, September 20, 2007
Federalism in Belgium [Yoo, Week 4, Substantive]
The jist of the Nye article was that states must integrate themselves into single economic market, and then gradually become a political unit. A regional group economic group formation will lead to various types of formal and informal governmental regional organizations, shifting power from central state governments towards the regional level. Europe would be the best example of this, although not exactly.
I'm not an expert on Belgium, but it appears that Belgium as a state was created nearly out of nowhere in order to create a buffer between France and Germany. Finally, after nearly 200 years, the country is on the verge of division.
The economies of the two regions are inextricably intertwined, and separation would be a fiscal nightmare.
Then there is the issue of the national debt (90 percent of Belgium’s gross domestic product) and how to divide it equitably.
But there is also deep resentment in Flanders that its much healthier economy must subsidize the French-speaking south, where unemployment is double that of the north.
I suppose that the current economic situation will not allow Belgium to split up immediately. I find this ecnomic integration in stark contrast with the political situation in the country:
Contributing to the difficulty in forming a new government now is the fact that all 11 parties in the national Parliament are local, not national, parties. The country has eight regional or language-based parliaments.
Why didn't economic unity create a more central Belgium government?
Of course, the irony is that Belgium is all for EU integration, and the headquarters of the EU itself is located in Brussels.
I think this might serve as an example of how integrating an area into a political and economic market might fail. It seems the Belgium state found itself incapable of federalising itself effectively. Are different ethnic groups really willing to give up their determination?
realist theory and nuclear capabilities
Whereas there is always a possibility that a nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist, I believe that this is a highly unlikely occurrence. First, nuclear weapons can be traced back to their origin, meaning a state supplying a weapon could easily be identified. No state willingly put themselves in such a position -- the resulting repercussions would be tremendous. Second, if the plans for a nuclear weapon were bought, the expertise as well as the expenses required would be too diverse and large for a non-state actor with limited resources. Stealing or buying a loose Soviet nuclear weapon is another possibility, but again, the chances of this are slim, considering the ease of origin identification and code locks. Also, it has been a relatively long period of time since a loose has been turned up, and so there may not even be that there are any more to account for.
That aside, I think that a major fault of the realist theory is this lack of acknowledgement for non-state actors. In the past couple of years, the presence of these actors has grown significantly, and it would be a grave mistake to discount their influence on acquiring a peaceful balance. Whether they have nulcear capabilities or not, they do have a growing presence in our political world.
Haas and Regional Integration
Another aspect of Haas’ argument that was not something I previously considered was the common threads between the Communication and Neo-Functional approaches. They both focus on gains and losses of actors, symbolic communications between elites, expectations of elites, and adequacy of institutions to handle dialog regarding integration. These common threads helped me to remember that theories are merely a tool for understanding the larger picture. Theories are bound to overlap, as no theory will always have a unique perspective on a certain issue.
Haas's Empirical Generalizations
Haas seems to contradict himself, where after miticulously going through the different empirical generalizations, such as mutual interdependece, industrialized-pluralistic nations, and late developing nations, he states that, “…A consideration of conceptual problems which remain ill defined and unresolved in the study of regional integration depite the wealth of empirical generalizations which have been generated.” In other words, after dedicating half of his article to these so called “generalizations” they actually nothing is proved and nothing is stated that helps the conceptuals problems of regions, which is one of the main criticisms of neofunctionalism.
Nye Article
I'm not entirely sure that Nye is correct on this one point. Using Europe as an example (simply because there really aren't many others), setting up a common market was a radical step taken only after there had a been a trade union in place for a decade and more. Even when armed with the neo-functionalist theory as a weapon, countries simply won't want to give up their trade rights immediately. They have to be eased into the idea. And even if a country follows through and a common market is established, there is no guarantee of what will follow. Europe is the most integrated community in the world and they still couldn't pass the common EU constitution is France and a few other countries. The world simply isn't read for integration on such a scale yet. So while I do support Nye's general principles peace through trade and economic integration, I think he is stretching at times to expand into what may well be impossible with his theory of political integration.
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Nye's Common Market
The common market leads to a trade interdependency and progressively to peace, a simpler functionalist evolution. Negative critics declare the common market forces a state to surrender too much economic autonomy, but Nye’s approach says to cut to the point rather than wade into the waters of integration, stripping off your nationalism piece by piece like layers of clothes. A direct common market allows you to preserve your sense of national culture through regional integration as well, and reduces unstable self-determinational attitudes. I enjoy Nye’s neo-functionalist model, but I think it is a little too hip for 2007. Once we take regional integration too far and collapse back upon ourselves, we will consider Nye seriously.
Haas
That aside, I found the Haas reading highly disjointed and difficult to appreciate. Although he does take context into consideration, there are simply too many independent variables that he puts forth. The independent variables are not tied together through any clear relationships, and so, they break the case for any sort of resulting theory. Haas recognizes this problem, but does not propose any constructive solutions. The entire discussion revolves around the flaws and context-specific exceptions to theoretical assertions. At the very end, Haas offers a constructive thought in that any sort of regional integration will promote war unless there is one complete [globally] integrated system in which state boundaries disintegrate. I agree with Haas, however, that this is a highly unlikely scenario. It is also one which cannot be proved, seeming as it has never existed in history.
After 40 pages of discussion, Haas is no closer towards establishing a comprehensive theory, and I am left feeling less confident in comprehending neofunctionalism all together.
Nye and the European Example
Specifically, the European Union’s gradual development would never have occurred the way it did outside of the unique political and economic situation it was in after World War II. Western Europe neighbored the satellites of communist Russia and almost completely dependent on the United States for military security. As Europe integrated, each individual state was acknowledging that this one the only way they could assert economic power in the world, considering the economic power of the United States at the time and Europe dependency on the US military. It is impossible to understand the European Union without acknowledging these circumstances.
Nye does discuss the “integrative potential of a region” (812). One could assert that the background described above set the tone for a high level of “integrative potential” in Europe at the time. This is further complimented by Nye’s acknowledgement of the importance of “complimentarity of elites, pluralism, and the symmetry (“size”) of the units” (812). When all of these factors are combined, it can help to explain the success of the EU. The problem is that the background is such a specific circumstance that it hard to imagine another situation in which a similar outcome would occur, something that Nye seems to acknowledge himself, but he still asserts the importance of the European model when studying other settings. After reading all the variables that Nye discusses, I am not convinced.
Friday, September 14, 2007
Reflection on 9.13 class
Neorealists believe international cooperation is unlikely to happen, whereas neoliberals believe cooperation will occur if there is mutual interest between states or actors. Absolute gains are emphasized in neorealism and relative gains are stressed in neoliberalism. Neorealists believe a state's concern for power and security are immediate factors affecting the state and neoliberals believe that issues and ideas like economic development, the environment, and the international political economy drives state behavior.
After the class discussion, it was evident that no single theory can provide all the answers. I believe that elements in both are beneficial when trying to grasp the international system and the way in which it operates. In addition, to me, these theories seem to imply a linear/ black and white answer for all issues. I think the all-encompassing nature of the theories may actually be a detriment to them-they do not often acknowledge the values-dilemma or state power-dilemma that states undertake when enacting policies.
Absolute Gains vs. Relative Gains [Yoo, Week 3, Dialogue]
Neo-Neo Debate
Class Discussion, 9/13
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Today's Lecture
Liberal vs. Realist
I agree with her, as well as both theories, on differing levels. I think that liberal theory does incorporate various important influences that realism tends to dismiss as irrelevant, such as ethics. I also agree that when it comes down to a fundamental threat to survival, a state will forget moral obligation and pursue any sort of power that will take away that threat. No one theory will explain all situations and all actors, and so neither is entirely true, but neither is wrong. Both models present two extremes that do not realistically apply to any one situation -- they explain a black and white world -- but with these idealistic or fundamental concepts, we have a starting point with which to make sense of a world in shades of grey.
Another explanation for why neither theory is solely right is that rational thought is actually a subjective concept. For example, war as a means to an end would not be rational in the eyes of a pacifist, just as capitalism would not be a rational concept in the eyes of a socialist state. The political and social institutions within a state determine the course of rational thought, and therefore, the theory that will apply in explaining actions. States can act rationally, but who defines what is rational?
Doyle - Liberalism and World Politics
Doyle- Liberalism and World Politics
Doyle evaluates three theorists who hold different views of liberalism; Schumpeter’s beliefs are in line with liberal pacifism, Machivelli’s with liberal imperialsm and Kant’s with liberal internationalism.
Schumpeter believes that capitalism and democracy lead to liberal pacifism. He argues that capitalism brings about economic rationalism and as a result, democratic capitalism leads to peace. According to Schumpeter, no democracy would pursue the minority interest, war profiteers and the elite, and tolerate the high costs associated with imperialism. Minorities like monopolists would encourage imperial expansion to gain access to more markets, but rational citizens would not allow this to be pursued. He has three main pacifist assumptions: there is no room for non-economic objectives for individuals, there is no room for non-economic objectives for states, and that world politics are homogenized.
Machievelli’s argument greatly differs from Schumpeter as he believes republics are not pacifistic. He contents that republics are actually the best mode of expansionism. Liberty associated with the free republic encourages increased population and property. He believes that citizens are all, in effect, trying to dominate others despite the facts that their goals are diverse.
Kant’s view of liberal internationalism stresses the belief that liberal states have created a peace among themselves. He believes perpetual peace will occur with a republic guided by a constitution, the formation of alliances between free states, and cosmopolitan law. Kant believes that cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. In his opinion, the market removes decisions of production and distribution from the realm of the state. Kant believes the interconnectedness of these characteristics will help sustain liberal peace.
I think there is merit to each argument. I believe that these arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive; within the international system, liberalism can bring about peace, imperialism, and international agreements in different states. I can understand how capitalism and democracy can facilitate peace, but I also see how it has fostered competition and conquest, both militarily and economically.
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Doyle Article
Kant's theory can be applied in particular to one work of fiction, West Side Story. In between all the dancing and singing there is a significant political agenda being played out in the streets of New York City. The Sharks are a group that is more or less represented by one man, Bernardo. The Jets are the local gang, in which there is more democracy; the ideas of all gang members are heard and listened to (and danced to), not just their leader Riff's. The Jets are the republic who fear the non-republic and their one-man-interests. The rest of the Sharks might not want a gang war with the Jets, but it is only Bernardo's views that matter. Riff and the rest of the Jets thus give the Sharks no rights that belong to most states, as the will of the entire group is not represented. The Jets go and accost Bernardo in what is considered neutral territory, the gymnasium, a place where no gang is allowed to operate as a group. In the international system, this would surely be similar to an invasion of sovereignty, a move a liberal democracy wouldn't make against another democracy. There is also no direct reference to the Jets fighting against other, more democratic gangs like themselves (except the desire to be "the best gang on the street"). Kant also states that these wars fought between republics and non-republics often do more damage than not, but both sides still agree to enter into the fight. Tony dies, Bernardo dies, and Riff dies, making everyone regret their loss of life. But both sides still decided to engage in a gang war, which they knew could have disastrous consequences.
It's true that the singing and dancing and the references to Romeo and Juliet slightly disrupt this analysis, but Kant's point on which Doyle focuses is nonetheless represented. He states that liberal democracies have a separate peace amongst themselves, but not in relation to dictatorship states. They fear these states (as the Jets did the Sharks) because one man overrides the voice of the people, making their actions erratic at times. Everything can be found in West Side Story, as if Kant was a Broadway aficionado all along.
Kay & the role of NATO [Yoo, Week 3, Substantive]
I found it particularly interesting that NATO's act of war in Kosovo violated a basic principle of inernational law as codified in the United Nations. The Charter of the UN states that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force for the kind of humanitarian campaign that NATO waged. Not only that, the members of NATO were going against even the core principles of their own institution, stating that member states must "refrain from the use of force in any manner i nconsistent with the purpose of the UN."
I think Emily makes a good point about how the NATO does not appear to have a purpose in today's world. Especially, I question the NATO's principle of "collective defense". I feel that collective defense is a rather outdated policy where the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar. As Emily, I question the purpose of NATO as an institution. However, I wonder why NATO is expanding to an even greater extent, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I wonder, who exactly are NATO members defending themselve against?
Kay Response
Using this example to demonstrate the role that international institutions play in the ability to wage war is not entirely fair because, as Kay mentioned, it is an institution without a purpose. It was created in a different world with a different set of problems. During the Cold War when there was a bipolar world, NATO was an alliance between the United States and its Western European allies. NATO is now trying to place itself in a new role in which it does not belong and thus does not fill that role effectively.
Kay was correct in saying "the result is that the key scholarly question may not be NATO's adaptation, but rather what institutional form is best suited to replace NATO." Neoliberalism cannot fully be criticized by NATO's deficiency now. Rather, if NATO ever was a well functioning institution then it proves that international institutions can play a positive role in world politics, and the fact that it failed to transition with the ever-shifting international order is a separate issue. Kay said that "the legacy of the Kosovo war has been a rapid decline in the relevance of NATO for its most important member, the United States and for some European allies now prioritizing the European Union." If NATO declines as it's ineffectiveness becomes clear in order to make way for other more effective institutions then it is a good sign for the neoliberalism. It would help to prove that international institutions exist for a real purpose and have a real impact, but if NATO continues exist without purpose then it will hard to make the case for a neoliberal point of view.
Monday, September 10, 2007
An analysis of Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant via Doyle
Another point I wanted to bring up refers to Doyle’s analysis of Machiavelli’s Liberal Imperialism. Machiavelli asserts that republics are the best form of guaranteeing state survival, and that they can be “characterized by social equality, popular liberty and political participation.” He also says that “we are lovers of glory” and that we seek to rule or avoid being oppressed, and so “necessity – political survival – calls for expansion.” The concept of expansion, however, even if it is supported by liberal motivations, portrays the importance of relative gains, a realist motivation. I find Machiavelli’s description a bit conflicting in the sense that imperialism is (as Schumpeter would also put it) “antithetical” to liberal theories.
An overall critique I have of Kant’s Liberal Internationalism is that even given his three “definitive articles” of peace, he is far too idealistic in assuming that man can act ethical and in accordance with all values, including his own, at all times. Situations are complex, and what is ethical is not always what can be done. People also take shortcuts and make mistakes that prevent them from acting as they should – it’s a part of human nature. He also fails to consider that some values can be fundamentally contradictory and does not address actors that have fully internalized some of these contradictions, such as fundamentalist terrorist groups. Countries cannot be fully hospitable towards these stateless actors because true intention can never be fully know – it is an internal thought. Also, ethics are never the only influencing factor in a situation, and until they are, Kant’s theory is merely a prediction that cannot be proved.
Friday, September 7, 2007
The Czech Example
Realist Dialogue
Domestic Policies and Realism
Continuing the Ethical Debate From Class
What is a state? [Yoo, Week 2, Dialogue]
Thursday, September 6, 2007
A continuation of class discussions
Another critique, which we discussed in our group in class, was Morgenthau’s criticism of motive in predicting the foreign policy actions of statesmen. Initially we though that his criticism was faulty in that power itself is the fundamental motive for action in the realist school of thought. What we eventually came to believe, however, was that Morgenthau meant that since you can never truly know the intent hidden within the mind of a statesman from the statements he makes to the public, motives are irrelevant in an empirical analysis of foreign policy. Morgenthau claims, however, that “intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as […] political ability to translate what [has been] comprehended into successful political action” is important in understanding foreign policy. It is ironic that he disregards motive. In his attempt to explain why states act the way they do, Morgenthau judges success by level of power. Isn’t this simply making the assumption that the ultimate motive, the ultimate reason for action, when stripped to its basics, is power itself?
Grieco- Week 2 Substantive
New liberal institutionalists argue that international institutions can help states cooperate. Neoliberal theory suggests that states with common political, economic, and military interests will be more likely to have political-economic cooperation. They agree with realists that anarchy impedes cooperation in the global system, but believe realists dramatically overemphasize conflict and the fail to give credit to institutions for their ability to promote cooperation between states. Neoliberalism suggests states seek to achieve maximum absolute gains and are indifferent to other states’ gains. They note states “cheating” in the system can potentially be a threat but contend new institutions eliminate that threat. These institutions are a stronghold of the international system. Other key actors include labor unions, interest groups, political parties, MNCs, and transgovernmental organizations.
Realists, on the other hand, believe that even among states with shared interests, the lack of a governing central authority fosters conflict and competition between states Realism, opposed to neoliberal institutionalism, does a far better job of addressing the issues of conflict and competition. According to Grieco, this means that realism is the most powerful theory of international politics.
Realists believe states are rational actors whose motives and actions are shaped by anarchy. In their point of view, states are preoccupied with the ideas of power and security. States are unwilling to cooperate because it may result in losing independence or security. Realists are also pessimistic about cooperation because they believe a state needs to focus not just on absolute gains but also maintaining a small gap in gains that are favorable for their partners. Due to the fact that realists address the uncertainties and risks of others actors, Grieco believe that realism provides a more comprehensive theory of the problem of cooperation than neoliberal institutionalism.
Although I agree with the majority of points in Grieco’s argument, I am reluctant to consider new liberal institutionalism as a void theory in international politics. The current international system and power structure encourages states to act in their own self-interest. If the costs of acting in such a manner ultimately began to dramatically hurt states, I believe states would begin to focus more on their absolute gains and less on the gap between gains from the respective partners.
Carr
Carr goes on to state that, “Military power, being an essential element in the life of the state, becomes not only an instrument, but an end in itself.” Wars are no longer for the sole purpose of increasing the size of an empire by trade or territory, but are instead used as a means to prevent other countries from gaining more military power; or as Carr put it, “…there is much justification for the epigram that ‘the principal cause of war is war itself.’” Even wars that usually start as wars for security or other purposes usually end up becoming wars for the acquisition of more power.
I also agree with Carr that as soon as a nation attains some little bit of power, their appetite for power grows; it is simply human nature. This is just as Machiavelli claimed that, “Men never appear to themselves to possess securely what they have unless they acquire something further from another.” And in today’s international politics, it is apparent that in order to adequately enforce one’s foreign and even domestic politics, a certain level of military power is required. Without the brute force to back up one’s policies, nobody would have to follow such policies; which was exactly what happened with the failure of the League of Nations in the 1950s.
Wednesday, September 5, 2007
Carr Article [Yoo, Week 2, Substantive]
Going off tangent, but for some reason I am reminded of the LEFT BEHIND book series by evangelical writers Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins. In case you haven't heard of them, they are a series of books about the Tribulation. Millions and millions of people vanish because of the Rapture, and the people remaining on Earth are left asking themselves what the hell happened. In the midst of this, a world government is formed. The "Global Community" becomes the prime center of power, and surprisingly the people of the world accept it, hoping for peace. Of course, not everybody is. World War III occurs because the American president finds it unacceptable to hand over a majority chunk of arms to the GC government. The war ends with a GC victory. The GC becomes a legitimate government, with the arms, soldiers, and funds to actually carry out what it wishes to do. A single world religion is formed, and the world is united under a single leader, the Antichrist at that.
After reading Carr's article, I think a world government like the GC is definitely impossible without a huge change in how our world is constructed. The dramatic events in the LEFT BEHIND series could only occur because of such a thing as the Rapture. In order for there to be consensus between all states, each state must give up some of its power. So will there ever be a world government? I guess only a Rapture can answer that question.
Grieco
On the same note, I think that Grieco should take greater consideration of context. His largest argument in his article circles around the hypocrisy of the neoliberal acceptance of realist principles and he continues to list competing fundamental hypothesis based on these theories. What he forgets, however, is that decisions and the reasoning behind them are never black and white. There are many external factors that influence decisions on the durability of arrangements, number of partners, etc. States act differently under different pressures, just as politics within a state can swing from left to right over a period of time. It may be that in accepting some realist values and the inconsistency of motives and decisions, the neoliberal argument may actually be closer to reality.
carr and the roll or propoganda in power politics
As Carr says himself, education is a necessary tool of propoganda, but freedom of thought inevitably follows education, as well. In Carr's discussion of "the necessity of some measure of comformity with fact," people will be much less likely to believe propoganda when the propoganda is no longer serving their needs. A good example of this is America's reaction to both the war in Vietnam and Iraq. As death toll's rise and wars extend, people will be less likely to listen to war propoganda. Thus in America, propoganda cannot control the media for an extended period time, and new forms of media hurt the ability for the state to produce propoganda rather than help it like Carr argues, especially the internet because it is easy to access a contrary point of view.
Perhaps there is more of a threat of lack of public opinion in more totalitarian states, but in such a connected world, even highly controlled countries are able to see past their own countries propoganda. During the Cold War, communist parts of Europe saw how they were lagging behind their neighbors. Further, Carr says that "human beings do in the long run reject the doctrine that makes might right." Government's cannot oppress people for an extended period of time without experience a rejection of propoganda and a manifestation of discontent, whether they can control that discontent or not. Despite Carr's initial claim about propoganda's role in determining the opinion of the masses, propoganda's role in power politics is fickle and limited.
The Hypocrisy of Realism
A tenet of realism is the existence of an anarchic international state system. But within the boundaries of realist thought, this is also hypocritical. The pursuit of dominance in realism negates anarchy. Soft power global dominance to ensure order, protection and survival is the utopia of realist thought. However, the ability of a state to control the global stage through any means (economically, militarily, etc.) is a form of an international system of control: the antithesis of anarchy.
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
Grieco Article
To further enhance my criticism of this argument I will draw upon the writings of JRR Tolkien's epic triology The Lord of the Rings (it said in the syllabus we could connect things to movies if we wanted). Those unfamilar with the The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers and The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King should know that there are two main nations fighting for the world men against the evil darkness of Sauron, being Rohan and Gondor. Rohan fights a major battle against an ally of Sauron in 'The Two Towers' and is recuperating within it's own borders when Gondor calls for military assistance to fight a battle with Sauron's armies at it's own border. At first Theoden, King of Rohan is skeptical, claiming that once Gondor (the mightiest nation in Middle Earth) has borne the brunt of the fighting then his own nation will be the most powerful. But is this any way to think when facing down the forces of darkness? Rohan was worried about the relative gain at first, its gain by comparison. But after some convincing from Gandalf the wizard, Theoden agrees to go to Gondor's aid and help fight the forces of evil.
Now, perhaps this is not the best example, but it came to my mind as well-suiting Grieco's point. I'm not saying states shouldn't worry about how much the power of other states is changing, but it seems paranoid at times to always worry about what allies are doing. If Rohan hadn't come to Gondor's aid, perhaps Sauron's armies could have trampled both nation's forces seperately, even if Rohan would have fared a little better in the end. JRR Tolkien didn't write this ending, but his books do have clear parallels to world affairs at the turn of the 20th century, so perhaps Grieco should pick up a fantasy novel instead of a history textbook.
Sunday, September 2, 2007
The Dialects of World Order: Theory and Perspective
First Class Discussion
I found the portion of the class discussion about the evolution of the modern state system and applying the rules of evolution to countries particularly interesting on Thursday. We discussed how that in
Agata made a lot of really good points about the EU, and I agree with her argument. I am divided in my thinking about how naturally that the EU evolved. I agree that the EU makes more sense as an economic entity, rather than a political one, and that member states must feel the same after the Constitution failed to be accepted. It makes sense that small states in Europe would join together because it is difficult for them to compete on an international scale against
Saturday, September 1, 2007
Alker Article Impressions. [Yoo, Week 1, Substantive & Dialogue]
Essentially, the world is a disorderly place, especially due to the "century of total war" in the 20th century. IR theories attempt to make sense of this disorder. Yet, these theories widely vary from national setting to setting. For example, in the United States IR debates have focused on traditional vs. behavior approaches, while dialectical approaches dominated the Soviet Union.
In class, we learned about how every day practices and IR theory are interconnected. I interpreted the lecture as being that every day practices can have a great impact on IR policies because the small things people do and feel mold their beliefs. It seems only natural that people's beliefs shape their view of the world, and exert influences on relationships between different states. Also, 'every day practices' are more than simply about 'small things'. I view every day practices as emcompassing a wide variety of human characteristics, as whether one is male or female, where one lives, whether one attends church or temple or not at all, etc. Cultural differences can have a huge impact on IR policy. I agree with Alker and Biersteker in that we need to take into account these variables in order to have a better understanding of IR policies internationally. We cannot assume our ideals are that of others, and that the world state system evolved into its current state due American-centric theories.
However, I agree with Dave that Marxism and communism take a less active role in world politics than it did in the past. Today's world is composed of centralized states with defined borders. There are only about a 190 'states' around the world, and diplomacy is handled between states and not 'nations'. With this in mind, I think the current debates between traditional and behavioral science approaches are more useful. There are still states that are stuck in the Soviet Union model, such as that of North Korea. I do not support ignoring these states, but they generally take a miniscule part in world politics. They are based on failed models of world order. Why focus on an outdated system?
In class, we learned about the evolution of how the modern state system became to be. Especially, the belief that modern states can more effectively deal with the world environment really appealed to me. I feel that if states adapted to become the most efficient system, than IR theories have to adapt to the times as well. As Dave pointed out, globalization is the standard in our state-centric world. Which theories are best at explaining the world? Not radical/Marxist dialectical approaches, I think.
Hayward Article
Ever since the downfall of the USSR, globalization has taken over as the new economic force on the planet. The USSR tried to stop the forces of capitalism in its region of the world, but with it's collapse global capitalism has swept across borders, bringing the world closer to one single market without tariffs. Lower communication and travel costs plus the Information Revolution mean that only a few bastions of communism and dictatorships still exist. Now, whether globalization is a positive force outside the economic realm or not is another matter altogether, but it has to be considered when talking about today's international system. Whether trying to predict future events, trying to critique civil injustices, or examine everyday events, this is the 21st century (forgive the expression, but it's appropriate). That's why I just can't take an article that still mentions "Cold Warriors" in the present tense with any real significance. Just look how far the world has come in the next twenty years.