American Identity

The Reluctant Fundamentalist dealt a lot with the concept of identity and how identities have shifted as a result of 9/11. In the book, three identities are singled out -- America, New York, and Pakistan -- but after 9/11, the New York identity disappears into the American identity, and American and Pakistani identities are pushed apart. Binary relationships strengthen after 9/11, as you can no longer identify with both -- you're either one or the other.

This led me to think about what it actually means to be an American, but when I thought about it, most things that came to mind were not really purely American. For example, Americans pride themselves off of their freedom and democracy, but this is clearly not unique to the United States. We also often consider ourselves a "melting pot" of cultures, which may be a relatively unique feature, but if this is true, then why did 9/11 bring about such tensions and prejudices between cultures? The only overtly "American" characteristics that came to mind were those stereotypes that foreigners often have of us -- materialistic, work-oriented, and obese -- some of which may not necessarily be true, but all of which are not the most pleasant of identities. So what is it that makes people so proud to be American? Although many of these characteristics are shared by others, I think it is the sheer magnitude of power we have behind everything we do, which gives us this pride in our identity -- it really is unique to the US. If this is the case, however, it may also feed into further resentment from alienated or terrorist groups. Perhaps we should take some time to reevaluate what it actually means to be an American.

Nandy

Nandy draws attention to the lack of severity in each of these hijacking cases and makes a connection to the dramatization later given to these events by the media. As Nandy mentioned, these first few cases may have been terrorism events in another, less violent era of Indian terrorism. In the end, Nandy describes one case where real guns are actually used, and the terrorist actively tries to take on the persona of a ruthless terrorist.

This shift led me to wonder about the role of media in all terrorist events. It is possible that in this case, with the negative slant on all of the peaceful hijackings a self-fulfilling prophecy was formed -- it was the media that helped propel terrorism onto a new level. By publicizing these events in an unrealistically dramatic way and creating fear of ineffective airport security and tensions with Pakistan, the media is also in essence furthering the terrorist cause. So how does this come about and what can be done about it? First, the right to report on such events cannot be revoked for the sake of free speech and the right of the citizen to know about the events, so reporting will continue. Second, if the media were to report kind stories in favor of terrorists, it would face severe backlash and the threat of treason, and so for reasons of self-interest, these stories can expectantly be limited -- though they should not be manipulated. Third, the media is often viewed as an expert source, though in reality it is not and it should not strive to become one on the matter of terrorism.

In sum, what can be done about the media is limited. Although media reporting may not be beneficial certain respects, it does increase our access to information and protect our right to free speech. The media does owe it to the public, however, to portray the truth. As difficult as it may be, journalists should approach each event without prior assumptions as to the severity of the situation and root causes. Creating a slant is one thing, but misreporting facts in a highly-respected and widely-distributed publication is an entirely different issue.

9/11 and Religion

Christine mentioned the classification of 9/11 as a religiously motivated event and the religious response of the US in terms of candle ceremonies and prayers in the days following the event. I thought this was an interesting connection, but one which needs some expanded thought. The US may have brought religion into their response, but it was not explicitly Catholic or Jewish or any other religion. Religion is a force that people turn to in order to cope with facts that are irrational -- it gives people hope that somehow, some irrational things will work out in the end. It wasn't our faith that caused us to develop a foreign policy that involved retaliation, but our general culture (pride, patriotism, etc.) that provoked it. I don't think that our response was essentially religious; it was human.

What the aftermath of 9/11 did expose, however, is some religious ignorance on the part of the US. Many people afterwards openly associated Muslims with terrorism, which is clearly not a just connection. Foreign policy should be accompanied by the tools to educate the public as to the rationale behind the policy decision. If that means a clarification as to the religious influences (or lack of religious influences) involved in policy decisions and terrorism, then I think that it should be considered. If something of that nature had already been in place, then maybe then the residents of Bethlehem wouldn't be as opposed to the Center for Islamic Studies as they are now..

Hurd's Article

Hurd does something very interesting in her paper. She begins by claiming to examine the "cultural basis of European opposition to Turkish accession to the EU" but ends up blending the boundaries between religious influences and politics and culture. Generally, she claims, Western views towards religion is secular -- the separation of church and state -- and so the West views religious influences as incompatible in the realm of politics. Her whole paper, however, seems to revolve around binary relationships with religion. For example, without religion, there would be no secular state. Simply choosing to separate religion from politics is a policy choice, and so involves religion. She also lets on that it is religious history that makes up a national identity and culture.

One particular passage I found intriguing was Hurd's description of the laicist view of Turkey's accession to the EU, that it "will progress incrementally through a series of stages of development, culminating in its full "Europeanisation." Considering that the basis of the laicist view is the "attempt to purge religion from politics" and "state control of religious institution and expression," I thought it ironic and necessary to point out that this concept of "Europeanisation" is much reminiscent of the process of "civilization" in the colonial era, and the quest to spread Christianity to less civilized populations. The simple attempt to purge religion from politics and to control it in such a manner is allowing religion to influence policy. Forcing such policies on others is no better than telling a person how he or she must think about religion -- it's just put into a political context.

Globalization of Political Culture

We talked a lot in class today about the globalization of culture in terms of popular culture, food and language, but that leaves me wondering about the globalization of political culture. Is it forced or is it natural or is it even occurring? The US often views that the global spread of democracy is inevitable, and that it is in the natural course of events. In support of this view, our government has often taken it upon itself to depose of corrupt leaders and to implement “democratic” elections to facilitate this process. Others, however, tend to view the spread of democracy as a forceful and parochial spread of US political culture. Can it even be called globalization if it’s a forcefully perpetuated series of events? Another example to ponder is that of the EU, which is trying to adopt a common constitution. Is the globalization of political culture occurring on more than just an ideological level, but also on a more concrete level of disintegrating borders? The constant rejection of constitution could prove that countries are actually resistant to the idea of a unified political culture but may be more open towards other kinds of globalization (ie. economical). Personally, I don’t believe that the globalization of political culture is as prominent as other sorts, but I’m curious to see other people’s thoughts.

globalization and unglobalization

Abu-Lughod’s piece on globalization, although not very thorough in an explanation, culminates with the idea that culture has somehow been simultaneously globalized and unglobalized. This is something I had not thought much about prior to this reading. The communication of cultures across the globe has increased our exposure to various foreign cultures, but this increased exposure only serves to increase our ignorance, given that exposure is often incomplete. As [a very broad] example, the media gives us access to accounts of communist control, sweatshops and high levels of pollution in China, but it tells us less about other aspects of Chinese culture. Even the typical Chinese take-out won’t give you a true glimpse of genuine Chinese cuisine. My point is that yes, we have access to more information from around the world, but as we gain this access, we have to take the extra step to complete the picture. By having so much more incomplete information about the world, we have so many more misconstrued or incomplete conceptions of what other cultures are like because in areas of uncertainty, people tend to fill the space in with what they do know – familiar ideas that make sense from their own cultural standpoint. To tie this back into the class on ethics and economic globalization, it’s like finding out that people are being paid very low wages in a third world country. This causes outrage and a push for change. What people don't realize, though, is that for that third world country's standard of living, such pay can be relatively high, and increasing cost of labor would only serve to decrease competitive advantage in the global economy, which would put everyone out of a job. People make judgements based on their own understanding of the world. Given a bit of information, it may be impossible to completely step out of one's existing constructions of the world, but the process of globalization hits us with a simultaneous increase in responsibility to fight ignorance.

Do ethics matter?

It is interesting to look at the irony behind ethics. It's everywhere from people's need to receive something in return for their charity, such as a bracelet or a t-shirt, to raising awareness, which many people, once they achieve this awareness and wear their pink shirts, don't actually do anything further for the cause. When I was in London this past semester, Starbucks had a day that they were giving out free small cups of coffee. What kind of coffee were they giving away? Free trade. I'm not sure exactly why they did this -- maybe they were trying to demonstrate the quality of fair trade coffee while hoping to drive up sales -- but all of this irony in itself seems unethical.

The question I'd like to ask, then is do ethics really matter? Some might argue that ethics don't matter so long as at least something is being done to help a problem, but I'd like to argue that it's the ethical side in all of us that at least pushes us into a little bit of action. States and corporations generally put up fronts to perpetuate a benevolent image, but the people behind the state create this need to satisfy an ethical longing in the first place. No matter how small or how full of irony this longing is, it's something, and as long as it exists, NGO's or Foundations can learn to use it to their advantage -- even if that involves giving out a few stickers or pens in return. Who cares if that's ethical or not? It's getting something done. Ethics do matter, but at different levels and at different points in the game.

The state's ego -- not so benign

Nandy makes a strong point that the concept of poverty alleviation has primarily become a defense mechanism of the ego -- our methods of "helping" the situation are actually worsening the "problem" of poverty by pushing it into the category of destitution. When applied to the state, Nandy claims that the poor are marginalized because once the proportion of the population living in poverty diminishes enough, that population no longer has any political pull within the government, and so the problem is pushed aside.

I agree with Nandy that development as a state strategy is either ineffective or only effective to a point, but I don't think that in the case of the state, that it is a form of protection of the ego. I do not believe that the state always acts in an ethical way but that it puts up a superficial front that it is acting so, which is necessary for political survival. It is the people within the state that have these moral dilemmas, and in order to please the people and maintain votes, a government must only appear to be addressing the problem to a certain extent. State intentions are not ethical, and so end results are not very effective (as Nandy argues) and this may be due to the superficiality of state action. NGO's more so represent a body with ethical conflictions over poverty and so their intentions are more ethical. Nandy should next evaluate the effectiveness of NGO action -- can true ethical intentions lead to more effective results? If so, the general population should shift support towards NGO efforts; they would still be doing the same to protect their egos while maybe actually accomplishing something as a byproduct.

hard power vs. soft power

An interesting question was raised in class on Tuesday as to the correlation between soft/hard power and femininity/masculinity. I think that it would be an accurate judgement to say that women are generally associated more with soft power and men with hard power in the world of international politics. As Enloe also mentioned, many women are behind the scenes negotiating through NGO's or labor unions or enacting their political influence in other ways through soft power. She also mentioned that these women are not highly visible, and so they are continually suppressed. It is interesting to note, however, that this may not be the case. Distribution of power between men and women may be closer to equality than Enloe makes it out to be. What she does not adequately address is the kind of power women exert. Who is to say that one form is better and more effective than the other? The UN, for example, recognizes the power of women in society by setting up programs where money is given directly to the women rather than the men in the family. Although in these third world countries the male is often the head of the household, the UN trusts that women are more likely to spend the money on their families and social infrastructure that will improve their society and so they empower the women. Applied to Enloe's argument, I think that men simply tend to be the drivers of a different kind of power -- hard power -- which is of a significantly greater visible nature.

Social constructions of women in politics

As a feminist, Enloe brings attention to the personal gender struggle for power and says that politics and power have been dominated by men, and that men have used this power to perpetuate the male-dominated world of international and personal relations. Powerful and successful women do exist, she says, but on an international level, only poor, powerless "Third World women" are visible. She makes the conclusion that international politics and national governments are suppressing women by perpetuating the image of a weaker woman.

I disagree with Enloe that women are so suppressed by the male exercise of power in international political relations. I do agree that politics are generally male-dominated, but I don't think that it's so drastically for the reason that women are suppressed. Whether it's a matter of social construction or human nature, women generally do tend to be less concerned with power than men and have other, more 'feminine' motives such as family. Although women may run into obstacles when they choose to enter a male-dominated field, men have the same obstacles in female-dominated fields. Why? Social constructions and human nature. People act in accordance with social constructions generally because they are comfortable, familiar and acceptable, and human nature can help shape social constructions. Women with desires to pursue other paths can do so if they have those qualities necessary for that construction -- whether it's strength, power or personal drive -- they just have to be able to publicly demonstrate those qualities. They may encounter obstacles in getting to high political positions of power because social construction and human nature shows us that men are generally less likely to involve emotion in decision-making and less likely to show weakness, but if a woman can publicly display those qualities, she is more likely to succeed in the political realm.

I agree with Enloe that a greater public emphasis on the stronger, independent, and politically active woman will change social constructions in the political world and allow women to achieve more successes in power politics, but Enloe's argument can be made when dealing with the alteration of any social construction. If this is to be so on an international level, it must happen globally across many male-dominated societies. The point I'd like to make is that some women in certain societies may be content pursuing values other than political power, and that certain qualities just are generally found more in males. The reason for the male-dominated world of international politics is not solely the result of male-exercised power, but it is also partially human qualities and personal preference on the part of the woman, which have contributed in shaping the social construction in the first place. The international is personal, but is so on multiple levels.

US imperialism

Part of the discussion in class today focused on the identity of the US as an imperial power. The main idea was that they world is not yet in a postcolonial context because the US still exerts imperial powers, not explicitly through colonies, but through its relationships and the true rationale behind its actions. I agree that the US has some imperialistic tendencies and a motivation to maintain its position of power, but I also think that this position is in a period of transition and that the US can no longer continue to act in the way that it has; the world is no longer a place conducive towards this sort of crusading action, and in continuing to act in this way, the US will not be able to maintain the political authority it currently has. For example, especially in the case of invading Iraq, the US provided faulty rationale -- whether it was "weapons of mass destruction", or following through on an old grudge, or anything else -- and just exploited it's position as a superpower. These actions were not very well received by the rest of the world, and respect for the US has declined. Even if the US does act with imperialistic motives in most of its foreign interactions, it isn't able to continue to do so because it is no longer as acceptable to act in such a way. It is questioned and contested by the rest of the world. The good news is, though, that while the rest of the world may now view us in a skeptical light, it is the government that they view in that way, and not the general American public. Presidential elections are coming up, and there may be a chance to change our position in the world... maybe.

Muppidi

Muppidi comes off strong with a negative sentiment towards the colonial influences of the Bush Administration in the first portion of his article. He refers to Mallaby's justification of "neoimperialism" and Ikenberry's critique of the Bush adminitsration's "imperial ambition" to further this sentiment. He also claims that Mallaby's perspective is concerned very little with the right of or costs to the poor, and that both authors claim that there is governance without voice.

While I agree more with Mallaby in that the US stepped into a leading role to to guide failed states rather than Ikenberry's theory of imperial ambitions, I don't think that it is fair to portray the US in such a negative manner. Taking a step back from the US example and looking at systemic qualities, one could recognize the benefits of a hegemonic system. In that sort of a system, the hegemony (the US) is forced to take on excessive burdens (ie. financial and military) in promoting global stability for others. In this capacity, it betters its own economic and political powers, but with the extra costs it takes on, it betters the positions of other states at a quicker rate, allowing them to catch up (hegemonic stability theory). Muppidi's focus in all instances, however, seems to discount any burden that must be taken on by this imperial power. The US has in many instances taken on and enjoyed a leading, policing role in the global context, but this role hasn't come without a price. There are costs, such as with the war on terror, that lie primarily with the US. Meanwhile, other actors have the luxury to stand back and focus on other domestic problems. I'm not saying that US intentions are always benign, and at times, imperial ambitions do come into play, but is it really fair to view the US position in such a negative, authoritative light?

There will always be those who gain less or suffer from a particular power structure, such as the poor, but this is not an imperial goal of the US. Responsibility as a leading power to consider all others does exist, but it is impossible to accommodate all equally. It is difficult to say whether a system better than this "neoimperial" system exists -- one where there can still be order with a greater voice from all actors and a lack of imperial global governance.

Disclaimer: Some of the words were cut off in the process of being copied, so I can't be entirely sure that I got all of the right concepts from the reading.

Constructivism as a main IR theory

Constructivism is considered one of the three main schools of thought in IR theory, but it is also the weakest of the three. The reason for this is because it is seen as a repetition of long-standing sociological theories simply applied to IR and also because it cannot predict the future actions of states nor the future configuration of the international system. In my opinion, however, I think this theory is the strongest because the world is not as black and white as the realists break it down to be.

As we mentioned in class on the first day, IR theory can be used as a tool to understand international relations, as a critique in examining how situations came about and what can be done to make things better in the future, and as an everyday practice. Constructivism satisfies all three of these conditions. It is a framework for understanding the current international system of states, and it can explain how that system came about. Although it does not make predictions for the future, it allows policy makers to make better decisions for the future based upon past experiences and learned social conventions. Constructivist theory is most of all an everyday practice. In essence, the theory focuses on current contextual situations, which change constantly -- everyday. This reasoning should go to support constructivism as an equal theoretical concept to liberalism and realism.

US identity

The constructivist theory is very fluid in its definitions of identity, relationships, and the boundaries of acceptable action. For this reason, I think it is the most realistic theory, as it accounts for changes in these structures that other theories write off as exceptions.

One interesting application of this theory would be towards the identity of the US. Since the end of WWII, the US has been a hegemonic power. It is evident, however, that the US might not be able to maintain that identity much longer. International popularity for our government is in a steady decline, and other international or multi-national organizations are gaining political weight. If one of the main US interests has always been to maintain order in a supreme position (thereby making it a sort of international policing power), will these interests persist in the shifting international environment? Can they persist when our relationships with so many foreign countries have been tainted? It will be interesting to see how the identity of the US will reshape itself in this situation.

Constructivism

Both Wendt and Jackson stand out from previous authors because they bring the issue of context into their theoretical approach. They focus on social relationships that are consistently redefined depending on their context. In doing so, the constructivist theory addresses the "grey matters" or exceptions that other theories cannot account for. Relationships and actor statuses are not static concepts, and so they can adapt to new situations based upon previous experiences or they can reformulate their concept of those past relationships based upon new information.

Jackson also addresses the concept of rationality. I mentioned in an earlier post that what is rational can really be subjective, since actions can be in line with certain values (and therefore rational in the eyes of those with similar values) but irrational for those that hold different values. Jackson uses the concept of legitimation to reiterate this. The same action can be explained in various ways, but one of those explanations will legitimate the action so that it is acceptable and "rational" in the eyes of another actor.

Jackson also refers to legitimation struggles as a "war of words," giving this process a very superficial sense. Simple words cannot be seen as concrete evidence of reason for action. This is similar to Morgenthau's dismissal of motive for lack of certainty; he claimed that there is no way to determine the truthfulness of a stated motive. Through a constructivist argument, however, this actually can be useful because what matters is the way actions are perceived. In reality, perception is the basis for the formation of identity and relationships.

Although this theory may prove prediction of action slightly more difficult, I find it more applicable to reality than the other theories we've studied.

realist theory and nuclear capabilities

Today's digression onto the topic of nuclear weaponry was interesting. Nuclear weapons do play into the power politics of the realist theory, but what the realist theory does not account for is the presence of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. To the best of our knowledge, terrorist groups do not yet have nuclear capabilities, but the question was posed as to whether it is likely that they can acquire this power in the near future. The concept of a non-state actor possessing a nuclear weapon is a terrifying though because the concept of mutually assured destruction does not apply when there is no concrete state or territory to retaliate against.

Whereas there is always a possibility that a nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist, I believe that this is a highly unlikely occurrence. First, nuclear weapons can be traced back to their origin, meaning a state supplying a weapon could easily be identified. No state willingly put themselves in such a position -- the resulting repercussions would be tremendous. Second, if the plans for a nuclear weapon were bought, the expertise as well as the expenses required would be too diverse and large for a non-state actor with limited resources. Stealing or buying a loose Soviet nuclear weapon is another possibility, but again, the chances of this are slim, considering the ease of origin identification and code locks. Also, it has been a relatively long period of time since a loose has been turned up, and so there may not even be that there are any more to account for.

That aside, I think that a major fault of the realist theory is this lack of acknowledgement for non-state actors. In the past couple of years, the presence of these actors has grown significantly, and it would be a grave mistake to discount their influence on acquiring a peaceful balance. Whether they have nulcear capabilities or not, they do have a growing presence in our political world.

Haas

After reading Haas' discussion on Regional Integration, there were two main points that I could agree with. The first is that IR theory is highly contextual. Haas breaks down federalism and neofunctionalism to many different outcomes and tendencies, based upon differing regions and other specific factors. As I've previously mentioned, no one theory can explain all relations without considering context at its foundation. The second point I agree with is that we can't define an end to integration because it will be unlike any entity we've seen before. For example, the EU is unlike any entity that has ever existed in history, and it is continuing to evolve into some unforeseen form.

That aside, I found the Haas reading highly disjointed and difficult to appreciate. Although he does take context into consideration, there are simply too many independent variables that he puts forth. The independent variables are not tied together through any clear relationships, and so, they break the case for any sort of resulting theory. Haas recognizes this problem, but does not propose any constructive solutions. The entire discussion revolves around the flaws and context-specific exceptions to theoretical assertions. At the very end, Haas offers a constructive thought in that any sort of regional integration will promote war unless there is one complete [globally] integrated system in which state boundaries disintegrate. I agree with Haas, however, that this is a highly unlikely scenario. It is also one which cannot be proved, seeming as it has never existed in history.

After 40 pages of discussion, Haas is no closer towards establishing a comprehensive theory, and I am left feeling less confident in comprehending neofunctionalism all together.

Liberal vs. Realist

We were asked in class today to give our take on the realist perspective versus the liberal perspective and one of our classmates raised the point that realism can be seen as the basic analysis of international relations. Liberal theory, she said, fails to explain times of war, pushing them aside as periods of deviance from rational thought.

I agree with her, as well as both theories, on differing levels. I think that liberal theory does incorporate various important influences that realism tends to dismiss as irrelevant, such as ethics. I also agree that when it comes down to a fundamental threat to survival, a state will forget moral obligation and pursue any sort of power that will take away that threat. No one theory will explain all situations and all actors, and so neither is entirely true, but neither is wrong. Both models present two extremes that do not realistically apply to any one situation -- they explain a black and white world -- but with these idealistic or fundamental concepts, we have a starting point with which to make sense of a world in shades of grey.

Another explanation for why neither theory is solely right is that rational thought is actually a subjective concept. For example, war as a means to an end would not be rational in the eyes of a pacifist, just as capitalism would not be a rational concept in the eyes of a socialist state. The political and social institutions within a state determine the course of rational thought, and therefore, the theory that will apply in explaining actions. States can act rationally, but who defines what is rational?

An analysis of Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant via Doyle

The basis for Schumpeter's argument was the "interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism." To prove his theory, he demonstrated that the arrival of capitalism and democracy over imperialism has led to unwarlike dispositions and a lack of forcible expansion, and therefore, more pacifism through the pursuit of common material interests. A few of his points, however, seem debatable (aside from those already pointed out by Doyle). First, he defines imperialism as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion," claiming that the private interests of imperialists have no larger objective on the national level. This makes a rather large assumption that private monarchical and militaristic attitudes do not include survival of the state as their first priority (a largely national objective). Without the survival of the state, private interests could not be pursued. He also claims that “the least feudal, most capitalist society – the US – has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies.” It could be easily argued against that the US portrays extremely imperialistic tendencies, from the days of the Monroe doctrine, to imperialistic actions in the Philippines, to even the Iraq invasion of 2003. The US has traditionally sought to expand its control on a localized and even global scale by acting as a global policing power. Schumpeter also reasserts his claim that capitalist democracy “steadily tells against the use of military force and peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war.” Schumpeter’s strict definition of force as war or warlike tendencies is also lacking depth. Even today, military force is used to create peaceful situations (for example, the current war in Iraq), or the threat of military force, even in international institutions, can be used to maintain existing peaceful situations (such as the UN Peacekeeping force in Sudan). Schumpeter’s definition of force must be expanded to encompass these aspects of force to truly be able to defend pacifism in capitalist democracies. Although the examples I have listed deal with governments of mixed political dispositions, I agree with Doyle’s assertion that Schumpeter must further address the variety in world and state politics, without simply assuming that evolution towards democracy and capitalism is inevitable for all countries.

Another point I wanted to bring up refers to Doyle’s analysis of Machiavelli’s Liberal Imperialism. Machiavelli asserts that republics are the best form of guaranteeing state survival, and that they can be “characterized by social equality, popular liberty and political participation.” He also says that “we are lovers of glory” and that we seek to rule or avoid being oppressed, and so “necessity – political survival – calls for expansion.” The concept of expansion, however, even if it is supported by liberal motivations, portrays the importance of relative gains, a realist motivation. I find Machiavelli’s description a bit conflicting in the sense that imperialism is (as Schumpeter would also put it) “antithetical” to liberal theories.

An overall critique I have of Kant’s Liberal Internationalism is that even given his three “definitive articles” of peace, he is far too idealistic in assuming that man can act ethical and in accordance with all values, including his own, at all times. Situations are complex, and what is ethical is not always what can be done. People also take shortcuts and make mistakes that prevent them from acting as they should – it’s a part of human nature. He also fails to consider that some values can be fundamentally contradictory and does not address actors that have fully internalized some of these contradictions, such as fundamentalist terrorist groups. Countries cannot be fully hospitable towards these stateless actors because true intention can never be fully know – it is an internal thought. Also, ethics are never the only influencing factor in a situation, and until they are, Kant’s theory is merely a prediction that cannot be proved.

A continuation of class discussions

Towards the end of class, an interesting question was brought up: what is the definition of a state? My answer to this question is simple. It is a political entity under a unified government within a set of distinct boundaries. Greg raised the point in class that the definition of a state depends on the type of government, that in the US, the population as a whole is a major component of political power within the state, but within a state such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the people do not have much of a say, and are therefore not a component of the state. Whereas this is a good point, I think that this is more of a definition of what the political organization of state is, and not what a state is itself.

Another critique, which we discussed in our group in class, was Morgenthau’s criticism of motive in predicting the foreign policy actions of statesmen. Initially we though that his criticism was faulty in that power itself is the fundamental motive for action in the realist school of thought. What we eventually came to believe, however, was that Morgenthau meant that since you can never truly know the intent hidden within the mind of a statesman from the statements he makes to the public, motives are irrelevant in an empirical analysis of foreign policy. Morgenthau claims, however, that “intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as […] political ability to translate what [has been] comprehended into successful political action” is important in understanding foreign policy. It is ironic that he disregards motive. In his attempt to explain why states act the way they do, Morgenthau judges success by level of power. Isn’t this simply making the assumption that the ultimate motive, the ultimate reason for action, when stripped to its basics, is power itself?