Carr

Carr explains that there are three different spheres of political power (military, economic, and power over opinion). He states, “…That these categories are closely interdependent; and though they are theoretically separable, it is difficult in practice to imagine a country for any length of time possessing one kind of power in isolation from the others.” While Carr goes on to explain the three spheres of power, it becomes evident that while political economics and public opinion are important to political power, all three are ultimately linked to military power and the fact that war is central to international relations. Every action the state takes is usually somehow directed toward the aspect of war or prevention of war.

Carr goes on to state that, “Military power, being an essential element in the life of the state, becomes not only an instrument, but an end in itself.” Wars are no longer for the sole purpose of increasing the size of an empire by trade or territory, but are instead used as a means to prevent other countries from gaining more military power; or as Carr put it, “…there is much justification for the epigram that ‘the principal cause of war is war itself.’” Even wars that usually start as wars for security or other purposes usually end up becoming wars for the acquisition of more power.

I also agree with Carr that as soon as a nation attains some little bit of power, their appetite for power grows; it is simply human nature. This is just as Machiavelli claimed that, “Men never appear to themselves to possess securely what they have unless they acquire something further from another.” And in today’s international politics, it is apparent that in order to adequately enforce one’s foreign and even domestic politics, a certain level of military power is required. Without the brute force to back up one’s policies, nobody would have to follow such policies; which was exactly what happened with the failure of the League of Nations in the 1950s.