Constant Change

Of all the theories we have gone over in class, I think that Constructivism relates more to the world that we live in today, primarily because of the idea that change is always constant. It makes perfect sense that because actors are always acting, there will be in change and vice versa. The idea of acceptable action also seems to tie in with current international relations; it is true that during every possible moment there are always two different choices that a leader, state, etc could make – that of change or not to change. Instead of looking at self-interest or the threat of punishment, Constructivists actually believe in rules and think that the rules are an extension of their identity.

Precedents in IR

In class we discussed the importance of precedents in the constructivist theory. When reflecting back on major shifts in the international system, many occurred at the same time that precedents were broken. When Hitler invaded Sudetenland, he broke precedent by refusing to recognize Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and then France broke precedent by not respecting its alliance with Chechoslavakia. These two aberrations played a large role in the chaos that ensued within the international system during World War II.

Breaking precedent can also have an impact on international institutions. Through precedents, a single country can give an institution more or less power. For example, when the United States attacked Iraq, even though the UN did not approve of it, the US took power away from the United Nations.

US identity

The constructivist theory is very fluid in its definitions of identity, relationships, and the boundaries of acceptable action. For this reason, I think it is the most realistic theory, as it accounts for changes in these structures that other theories write off as exceptions.

One interesting application of this theory would be towards the identity of the US. Since the end of WWII, the US has been a hegemonic power. It is evident, however, that the US might not be able to maintain that identity much longer. International popularity for our government is in a steady decline, and other international or multi-national organizations are gaining political weight. If one of the main US interests has always been to maintain order in a supreme position (thereby making it a sort of international policing power), will these interests persist in the shifting international environment? Can they persist when our relationships with so many foreign countries have been tainted? It will be interesting to see how the identity of the US will reshape itself in this situation.

Reflection on class 9.27

Constructivism has four main focal points: history and change, state interest and its identity, anarchy being thick, and international institutions and how they help change state’s ideas about what policies they should follow. I found the notion of “anarchy being thick” to be the most interesting. Within the international system, states recognize other states’ sovereignty. Although there is no over-arching world government, sovereign states agree to behave in certain ways. This perpetuates the notion that despite the anarchic system, rules and norms do exist. This view of anarchy is a central tenant of constructivism discussed in class.

Relational Constructivism and 9.11

After reading Jackson’s Relational Constructivism: A War of Words, I thought about using relational constructivism to approach the actions taken by the U.S. government following September 11, 2001. This theory emphasizes the activities devoted to legitimizing actions; the actors give public reasons for their course of action, actors criticize all other options, and also place blame and responsibility on those with opposing views.

In hindsight, it is easy to apply this theory to the actions undertaken by the Bush administration in the post-9/11 world. Bush’s team gave reasons for attacking the Taliban in Afghanistan- they allowed a terrorist regime to hide in the mountains and prepare their next unprovoked attack against “Western” nations. The administration stressed that this military action was not an attack against Muslims but on Islamic Extremists who sought to invoke terror on the free world. News media became a pulpit; it was extensively used to convey the necessity of action. They garnered international support in order to demonstrate the international community’s support against terrorism . The administration criticized other options- if you did not support the war effort in Afghanistan, you were viewed as unpatriotic and weak for not wanting to stop extremism. Blame was placed on other regimes; it did not matter that U.S. intelligence, the FAA, the Clinton Administration, the military etc. had failed to protect American lives by preventing the attack.

Although I do not believe this theory has all the answers, I do believe that relational constructivism sheds an interesting light on IR theory. I believe that the legitimacy aspect of this perspective does play a large role in state actions.

Constructivism

Both Wendt and Jackson stand out from previous authors because they bring the issue of context into their theoretical approach. They focus on social relationships that are consistently redefined depending on their context. In doing so, the constructivist theory addresses the "grey matters" or exceptions that other theories cannot account for. Relationships and actor statuses are not static concepts, and so they can adapt to new situations based upon previous experiences or they can reformulate their concept of those past relationships based upon new information.

Jackson also addresses the concept of rationality. I mentioned in an earlier post that what is rational can really be subjective, since actions can be in line with certain values (and therefore rational in the eyes of those with similar values) but irrational for those that hold different values. Jackson uses the concept of legitimation to reiterate this. The same action can be explained in various ways, but one of those explanations will legitimate the action so that it is acceptable and "rational" in the eyes of another actor.

Jackson also refers to legitimation struggles as a "war of words," giving this process a very superficial sense. Simple words cannot be seen as concrete evidence of reason for action. This is similar to Morgenthau's dismissal of motive for lack of certainty; he claimed that there is no way to determine the truthfulness of a stated motive. Through a constructivist argument, however, this actually can be useful because what matters is the way actions are perceived. In reality, perception is the basis for the formation of identity and relationships.

Although this theory may prove prediction of action slightly more difficult, I find it more applicable to reality than the other theories we've studied.

"Anarchy is thick" [Yoo, Week 5, Dialogue]

I would like to take Lauren's view on anarchism and constructivism one point further. I would like to question anarchy as not being uniform, as well. Although I agree that norms exist in our world system, the world system is not uniform. We say that states recognize each other's sovereignty, which is true. But there definitely exists a hierarchy of states in the international system. China's relationship with Mongolia, for instance. Mongolia is overwhelmingly powerless next to China's new found growth and prosperity. These power-shifts can change as well; during the 1060's, North Korea was viewed as the more powerful Korea, and the survival of the South was questioned. Read this:"A few years back I asked a South Korean Minister of Finance if he took North Korean behavior into account when formulating South Korean economic policy. "No," he replied, "those guys in the North are crazy. We don't pay any attention to them." Yet even with this overwhelming economic superiority, the South still has to take into account the North when concerning security issues. Yes, anarchy is thick, but the norms between countries differ significantly according to different situations.

Jackson Article

I like Jackson's article because it asserts the fact that there is more of a human element to the international system. Most of the other authors we've read have talked about the state or NGOs as the be-all-end-all in the international system. While it's true that they have the most important role, one must also look at leader's and domestic politics. While Jackson makes little reference to that, he mentions legitimization as playing an important role. People have to legitimate what is being done by a country, it doesn't simply happen. The populous must deem that a course of action is acceptable, and thus it it legitimate. The one key example he uses is the Kosovo bombings, and how much publicity those gained. People had to understand what was going on before states could give their responses.
This is why I like the contructivist model the best of what we have learned so far. It doesn't just assume state action, but backs it up with a human component as well. Jackson's article seems to me to do a good job of explaining a theory that seems to be closer to how I view the international system than anything else set forward so far.

Relational Constructivism

Jackson brings up a crucial point when he talks about the issue of legitimation, and the fact that it is usually overlooked in both the realist and liberal analyses when it comes to international relations. Legitimation refers to the process whereby an act, process, or ideology becomes legitimate by its attachment to norms and values within a given society. It is the process of making something acceptable and normative to a group or audience. Jackson refers to the Kosovo bombing of Albanian refugees and the impact and reactions of many different states and international organizations as to the repercussions of the bombing. He refers to relational constructivism as a “war of words,” which I tend to agree with, considering the large amount of public pronouncements and speeches that were given about the legitimacy of the bombing.

Constructivism seems to be contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. Jackson states, “…A relational constructivist approach enables analysts to focus on how questions of authority and legitimacy are negotiated in practice.” While the words of leaders are extremely important in swaying the bias of a state, I still feel that the old saying is truer, that actions speak louder than words. Sometimes it seems that today the only thing that those in charge do is talk. It even seems that way when we look at the other “isms” that we already went over; they continually talk of a need for world peace, but yet they really don’t put forth an idea for action toward such a future.

Jackson and Rhetoric

Jackson placed a high value on rhetoric when discussing relational constructivism. It is interesting that this is the first time we have heard about rhetoric in our study of "isms" thus far in the semester because it is such an important part of politics, and such a tool to help leaders get their governments and people to support shifts in involvement in the international system.

Jackson argues that "rhetorical commonplaces" are actually one for the two ways that agency is preserved. Different rhetoric is used for different parties. Jackson then discusses that "nesting: bombing in the name of civilized humanity" is a strategy to act abroad in a way that abuses traditional state sovereignty. "Nesting" is thus another way of using rhetoric in order to achieve a certain goal. Jackson concludes the chapter saying "actions are caused by the specific configuration of rhetorical resources brought to bear at a given point in time."

This argument implies that actors in the international system are going to act as they want, and that these actors will achieve "legitimation" through rhetoric. Even those who abide by a more realist philosophy use rhetoric in order to accomplish goals. Just like rhetoric was used to legitimize bombing Serbia, which was considered a purely humanitarian cause, rhetoric was used by President Bush when he wanted to invade Iraq. His rhetoric alienated the international community, but it also put Congress and US citizens behind the war, at least temporarily. One could also argue that the world may perceive the United States very differently if it was more cautious about the rhetoric it used in the international community.

Thoughts on Nuclear Weapons [Yoo, Week 4, Dialogue]

Basically, I think nuclear weapons suck. I also think the chances of a nuclear war happening is slim. Somebody pointed out that you would like to believe that the states posessing nuclear weapons are responsible enough not to use them out of fear for an outright nuclear war. I believe this. Do you really think a country like North Korea is crazy enough to start shooting nuclear bombs into South Korea or Japan? I guess this isn't the best example, as Kim Jong Il is a maniac, but really. The nuclear powers who really matter in international relations, like the US and China, are so closely interwined economically that a war between them seems remote. I agree with everybody that nuclear weapons may become a major problem if rogue terrorists posessed them, but I think the chances of terrorists gaining nuclear capability are slim. Maybe I am underestimating terrorist networks, but I believe nuclear power is complicated to the point that only valid states can effectively manage them. In today's world, nuclear weapons don't appear to be anything more than simple flexes of power. Who uses a nuclear bomb nowadays anyway?

I would like to use this post to rearticulate something I tried to express in class in response to the question about the -isms' ability to prevent war. Wars of national liberation, genocidal wars and wars on terror are not accounted for in any of the theories we have discussed. Functionalism fails by preventing the international facilitation of peace, realism defines the action of rational states seeking security, and liberal wars are paradoxical in the sense of their mission to spread peace and democracy. National liberation and new wars, however, are ethically justified by the aggressor and the 'terrorist' agents. If a war is ethical and justified it is rational, yet warring states are generally considered to be acting irrationally under the constraints of international theories.

class discussion response

Alex's point that the theories we have been studying are not equipped to explain terrorism is a great one. It is particularly a problem for the realist theory because it does not take any actors besides the state into account. This is a serious problem, when you apply realism to today's world. I cannot think of one conflict in the world today that is between two sovereign states, yet there are more violent or turbulent regions than you can count. The conflict in the world can be explained by ethnic conflict and terrorist tactics. We have not yet studied a theory that takes these two issues into account. As we discussed in class, it is these two issues that make the nuclear threat particularly frightening.

Class Discussion, 9/20

One point from yesterday's broad discussion that I don't think was given enough focus was the point of the increasing porosity of state borders in today's world. A few people mentioned how the ones most likely to use a nuclear weapon would be those who aren't state centered. As we learned in IR 10, terrorist organizations are more and more resembling multi-national corporations. Small cells that don't have a state and thus aren't defined by any one territory. We've been trying to bomb al-Qaeda for what, six years now? It hasn't really been working. Israel can't fully defeat Hezbollah because every time they try the rebel group just runs across the border to Syria, or dig deeper trenches in the Lebonese land. The world is becoming increasingly globalized, making states more and more obsolete in the process.
Not that the state is obsolete yet, but what may be are the theories we have learned in class. Realism, functionalism, neo-whatever may be an appropriate guide to show how to react to other states, but not terrorists groups. If a nuclear attack occurs, these people will simply retreat back into hiding and countries can't have any response. Invade and bomb a sovreign nation like Pakistan, which supports the War on Terror because someone chose to take up refuge in their unpolicable mountain range? I believe that while the theories we've learned are still partially relevant in today's world, many of them lack the forsight to see into today's modern, globalized world.

Religious Wars

During our discussion in class on Thursday, it seems that we bypassed the significance of religious wars and the complete lack of acknowledgement to them by the different international theories. A religious war is a war justified by religious differences. It can be the forces of one state that has an established religion against those of another state with either a quite different religion or a different sect within the same religion, but it could also be at the level below a state. It can be a faction motivated by religion attempting to spread its faith by violence either within the state or elsewhere. While the different theories that we have gone over prove why world peace has never happened, they still do not come up with concrete advice or steps to obtain peace. Even though the theories don’t touch upon religious wars and conflicts, I think it is highly unlikely that we will ever be able to achieve world peace. Even if states somehow find a way to all co-exist happily within their governmental realms, this does not take into account the severe differences of religion from state to state and region to region that would make it impossible for them to agree on every aspect of international relations.

Federalism in Belgium [Yoo, Week 4, Substantive]

Apparently, calls for a breakup are growing ever louder in Belgium, according to an interesting article in the NYT.
The jist of the Nye article was that states must integrate themselves into single economic market, and then gradually become a political unit. A regional group economic group formation will lead to various types of formal and informal governmental regional organizations, shifting power from central state governments towards the regional level. Europe would be the best example of this, although not exactly.
I'm not an expert on Belgium, but it appears that Belgium as a state was created nearly out of nowhere in order to create a buffer between France and Germany. Finally, after nearly 200 years, the country is on the verge of division.

The economies of the two regions are inextricably intertwined, and separation would be a fiscal nightmare.
Then there is the issue of the national debt (90 percent of Belgium’s gross domestic product) and how to divide it equitably.
But there is also deep resentment in Flanders that its much healthier economy must subsidize the French-speaking south, where unemployment is double that of the north.

I suppose that the current economic situation will not allow Belgium to split up immediately. I find this ecnomic integration in stark contrast with the political situation in the country:

Contributing to the difficulty in forming a new government now is the fact that all 11 parties in the national Parliament are local, not national, parties. The country has eight regional or language-based parliaments.

Why didn't economic unity create a more central Belgium government?
Of course, the irony is that Belgium is all for EU integration, and the headquarters of the EU itself is located in Brussels.
I think this might serve as an example of how integrating an area into a political and economic market might fail. It seems the Belgium state found itself incapable of federalising itself effectively. Are different ethnic groups really willing to give up their determination?

realist theory and nuclear capabilities

Today's digression onto the topic of nuclear weaponry was interesting. Nuclear weapons do play into the power politics of the realist theory, but what the realist theory does not account for is the presence of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. To the best of our knowledge, terrorist groups do not yet have nuclear capabilities, but the question was posed as to whether it is likely that they can acquire this power in the near future. The concept of a non-state actor possessing a nuclear weapon is a terrifying though because the concept of mutually assured destruction does not apply when there is no concrete state or territory to retaliate against.

Whereas there is always a possibility that a nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist, I believe that this is a highly unlikely occurrence. First, nuclear weapons can be traced back to their origin, meaning a state supplying a weapon could easily be identified. No state willingly put themselves in such a position -- the resulting repercussions would be tremendous. Second, if the plans for a nuclear weapon were bought, the expertise as well as the expenses required would be too diverse and large for a non-state actor with limited resources. Stealing or buying a loose Soviet nuclear weapon is another possibility, but again, the chances of this are slim, considering the ease of origin identification and code locks. Also, it has been a relatively long period of time since a loose has been turned up, and so there may not even be that there are any more to account for.

That aside, I think that a major fault of the realist theory is this lack of acknowledgement for non-state actors. In the past couple of years, the presence of these actors has grown significantly, and it would be a grave mistake to discount their influence on acquiring a peaceful balance. Whether they have nulcear capabilities or not, they do have a growing presence in our political world.

Haas and Regional Integration

Haas’ believes that the study of regional integration is concerned with the explanation of how and why sovereign states voluntarily merge and mix with their neighbors so they loose aspects of sovereignty, in terms of economics, politics and defense, while acquiring new techniques for conflict resolution. He also states that regional integration is concerned with the outcomes of regional cooperation. I found it very interesting that the common market was the best means for rapid regional integration. This leads to maximizing spillover across countries. “Spillover in the scope of collective action,” was a phrase use to depict the nature of integration; it was a process where actors made decisions incrementally.

Another aspect of Haas’ argument that was not something I previously considered was the common threads between the Communication and Neo-Functional approaches. They both focus on gains and losses of actors, symbolic communications between elites, expectations of elites, and adequacy of institutions to handle dialog regarding integration. These common threads helped me to remember that theories are merely a tool for understanding the larger picture. Theories are bound to overlap, as no theory will always have a unique perspective on a certain issue.

Haas's Empirical Generalizations

In Haas’s attempt to explain empirical generalizations and their limits, he initially starts out with a paragraph stating that none of these generalizations are really “true” per say, but are instead just verified. He labels them as “imperfect pretheories” of regional integration, and continues on to say that they are a mixed jumble of terms that lack any hierarchy of terms, constructs and concepts. This only helps to prove the criticism that functionalism is teleological, that is it attempts to describe social institutions solely through their effects and thereby does not explain the cause of those effects. Functionalism has no concept of change and is unable to account for stuctural contraditions, conflict, or social changes.

Haas seems to contradict himself, where after miticulously going through the different empirical generalizations, such as mutual interdependece, industrialized-pluralistic nations, and late developing nations, he states that, “…A consideration of conceptual problems which remain ill defined and unresolved in the study of regional integration depite the wealth of empirical generalizations which have been generated.” In other words, after dedicating half of his article to these so called “generalizations” they actually nothing is proved and nothing is stated that helps the conceptuals problems of regions, which is one of the main criticisms of neofunctionalism.

Nye Article

I agree with Nye's point in "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model" that the functionalists model was bound to appear when it did, after two wars that nearly destroyed the continent, massacring much of the population as well. The way to achieve a more lasting peace is to create interdependency between the nations. That is how the European Economic Community first started, a way fro France and Germany to be more peaceful by relying on each other's steel and coal reserves. By uniting the markets, the countries have too much to lose by engaging in another bitterly destructive war. Nye says that the way to fully integrate is not to form a loose coalition based on trade first, but to simply establish a single market in the region first, and let spillover step in from there to achieve more political (common defense and international policies).
I'm not entirely sure that Nye is correct on this one point. Using Europe as an example (simply because there really aren't many others), setting up a common market was a radical step taken only after there had a been a trade union in place for a decade and more. Even when armed with the neo-functionalist theory as a weapon, countries simply won't want to give up their trade rights immediately. They have to be eased into the idea. And even if a country follows through and a common market is established, there is no guarantee of what will follow. Europe is the most integrated community in the world and they still couldn't pass the common EU constitution is France and a few other countries. The world simply isn't read for integration on such a scale yet. So while I do support Nye's general principles peace through trade and economic integration, I think he is stretching at times to expand into what may well be impossible with his theory of political integration.

Nye's Common Market

Nye describes the conception of neo-functionalist political theory as the rational outcome of total war. Nye supports the classical neo-functionalists (if that makes sense) and their motives to integrate states in a region politically to achieve peace. However, he calls this loosely structured and suggests a revised neo-functionalist approach of a stringent common market. Logically, a common market with political roots would imply an economic union, which would lead to peace. Western Europe is a perfect example of regional integration, but even it has its faults. Haas uses an economic union to create a broader functional model. Nye suggests we cut through the single-path spillover theory and directly implement a common market. This would involve a large number of political actors and use the spillover theory inherent in economic policy to shape political policy, defense policy, etc.

The common market leads to a trade interdependency and progressively to peace, a simpler functionalist evolution. Negative critics declare the common market forces a state to surrender too much economic autonomy, but Nye’s approach says to cut to the point rather than wade into the waters of integration, stripping off your nationalism piece by piece like layers of clothes. A direct common market allows you to preserve your sense of national culture through regional integration as well, and reduces unstable self-determinational attitudes. I enjoy Nye’s neo-functionalist model, but I think it is a little too hip for 2007. Once we take regional integration too far and collapse back upon ourselves, we will consider Nye seriously.

Haas

After reading Haas' discussion on Regional Integration, there were two main points that I could agree with. The first is that IR theory is highly contextual. Haas breaks down federalism and neofunctionalism to many different outcomes and tendencies, based upon differing regions and other specific factors. As I've previously mentioned, no one theory can explain all relations without considering context at its foundation. The second point I agree with is that we can't define an end to integration because it will be unlike any entity we've seen before. For example, the EU is unlike any entity that has ever existed in history, and it is continuing to evolve into some unforeseen form.

That aside, I found the Haas reading highly disjointed and difficult to appreciate. Although he does take context into consideration, there are simply too many independent variables that he puts forth. The independent variables are not tied together through any clear relationships, and so, they break the case for any sort of resulting theory. Haas recognizes this problem, but does not propose any constructive solutions. The entire discussion revolves around the flaws and context-specific exceptions to theoretical assertions. At the very end, Haas offers a constructive thought in that any sort of regional integration will promote war unless there is one complete [globally] integrated system in which state boundaries disintegrate. I agree with Haas, however, that this is a highly unlikely scenario. It is also one which cannot be proved, seeming as it has never existed in history.

After 40 pages of discussion, Haas is no closer towards establishing a comprehensive theory, and I am left feeling less confident in comprehending neofunctionalism all together.

Nye and the European Example

Nye says that “the original neo-functionalist formulation paid insufficient attention to the role of external factors in integration processes” (811), and that he “include[s] regional actor perceptions of the external situation as one of the integrative conditions that we will examine below and consider only involvement of external actors in the integration scheme as a process mechanism” (118). In short, Nye says that sometimes external factors can positively impact integration, and sometimes it can negatively impact integration. When examining the role of external factors in the establishment and continued growth of the European Union, there is no greater mechanism in the establishment of Europe’s regional integration than a set of unique driving forces that Nye fails to mention.
Specifically, the European Union’s gradual development would never have occurred the way it did outside of the unique political and economic situation it was in after World War II. Western Europe neighbored the satellites of communist Russia and almost completely dependent on the United States for military security. As Europe integrated, each individual state was acknowledging that this one the only way they could assert economic power in the world, considering the economic power of the United States at the time and Europe dependency on the US military. It is impossible to understand the European Union without acknowledging these circumstances.
Nye does discuss the “integrative potential of a region” (812). One could assert that the background described above set the tone for a high level of “integrative potential” in Europe at the time. This is further complimented by Nye’s acknowledgement of the importance of “complimentarity of elites, pluralism, and the symmetry (“size”) of the units” (812). When all of these factors are combined, it can help to explain the success of the EU. The problem is that the background is such a specific circumstance that it hard to imagine another situation in which a similar outcome would occur, something that Nye seems to acknowledge himself, but he still asserts the importance of the European model when studying other settings. After reading all the variables that Nye discusses, I am not convinced.

Reflection on 9.13 class

The neo-neo debate presents the points of differentiation in neoliberal and neorealist schools of thought. Although they both agree that the international system is characterized by anarchy, it appears that their disagreements greatly separate the two theories.

Neorealists believe international cooperation is unlikely to happen, whereas neoliberals believe cooperation will occur if there is mutual interest between states or actors. Absolute gains are emphasized in neorealism and relative gains are stressed in neoliberalism. Neorealists believe a state's concern for power and security are immediate factors affecting the state and neoliberals believe that issues and ideas like economic development, the environment, and the international political economy drives state behavior.

After the class discussion, it was evident that no single theory can provide all the answers. I believe that elements in both are beneficial when trying to grasp the international system and the way in which it operates. In addition, to me, these theories seem to imply a linear/ black and white answer for all issues. I think the all-encompassing nature of the theories may actually be a detriment to them-they do not often acknowledge the values-dilemma or state power-dilemma that states undertake when enacting policies.

Absolute Gains vs. Relative Gains [Yoo, Week 3, Dialogue]

In class, the thing I found most interesting was that neo-liberals stress absolute gains, while neo-realistics stress relative gains. I'm not really sure how to interpret these different types of "gains". Does absolute gains signify a gain - whether economic, territorial, etc. - that it makes regardless of how the another state is doing? Do states not care about where they stand in the world, as long as they are improving their own society? Meanwhile, does relative gains signify a state concerned with maintaining power in relation to other states? Which attempts to be more powerful, more economically stable, etc? If my jist is correct (and I may be absolutely wrong), I find the neo-liberal argument of absolute gains very unrealistic (That sounds ridiculous). I can't help but feel that countries are in competition to become more influential and/or powerful. If you become a world power, somebody has to lose, right? Just look at how our world politics are structured. The "8 largest economies" of the world meet in the G8 Summit (because apparently the G8 economies are the most important, even though they don't include China or India), and the UN Security Council hold powers which other members do. So which type of "gain" is more revelent in today's society?