Today's Lecture

We discussed at the end of class the frustration of reading IR theory that never is able to give a comprehensive look at the dynamics of the international order. Just because an individual theory cannot give us a comprehensive understanding of how states relate to one and other, does not mean that it cannot help to further understand a given situation. It is important to examine where theories overlap and where they contrast in order to use them effectively. Today we learned about the neo-neo conflict. Having the knowledge to compare and contrast these two theories is more important than understanding the theories on their own because only after understanding biased perspects can you consciously see your own bias. Every flaw that you find in theory is something that you can recognize when attempting to assess a real situation.

Liberal vs. Realist

We were asked in class today to give our take on the realist perspective versus the liberal perspective and one of our classmates raised the point that realism can be seen as the basic analysis of international relations. Liberal theory, she said, fails to explain times of war, pushing them aside as periods of deviance from rational thought.

I agree with her, as well as both theories, on differing levels. I think that liberal theory does incorporate various important influences that realism tends to dismiss as irrelevant, such as ethics. I also agree that when it comes down to a fundamental threat to survival, a state will forget moral obligation and pursue any sort of power that will take away that threat. No one theory will explain all situations and all actors, and so neither is entirely true, but neither is wrong. Both models present two extremes that do not realistically apply to any one situation -- they explain a black and white world -- but with these idealistic or fundamental concepts, we have a starting point with which to make sense of a world in shades of grey.

Another explanation for why neither theory is solely right is that rational thought is actually a subjective concept. For example, war as a means to an end would not be rational in the eyes of a pacifist, just as capitalism would not be a rational concept in the eyes of a socialist state. The political and social institutions within a state determine the course of rational thought, and therefore, the theory that will apply in explaining actions. States can act rationally, but who defines what is rational?

Doyle - Liberalism and World Politics

The thing that struck me most about Doyle's dry analysis of liberal theory was how relevant it is today. Written in 1986, Doyle describes liberal states as peaceful, yet prone to make war paradoxically over peace. Since I was born in 86, I don't really know much about our presence as "freedom fighters' in Latin America, but from the context, it is basically interchangable with our tour in the Middle East. Liberal states have discovered peace in aggression, which is as terrifying. Liberalism tends to be affiliated with pacifism, as is the nature of inter-dependency and democracy, yet Doyle makes the claim that liberal states are prone to make war; a war of imperial peace, however, is paradoxical and pseudo-realist. Material and democratic states will cooperate to inhibit free trade and liberty, but only after a state has been converted to democracy and inflicted by globalization. Doyle's description of liberalism is all encompassing and complete. By utilizing the historical theories of Machiavelli and Kant, he proves the grounds of liberal theory to be constant but the details flexible to their environment.

Doyle- Liberalism and World Politics

Week 3


Doyle evaluates three theorists who hold different views of liberalism; Schumpeter’s beliefs are in line with liberal pacifism, Machivelli’s with liberal imperialsm and Kant’s with liberal internationalism.

Schumpeter believes that capitalism and democracy lead to liberal pacifism. He argues that capitalism brings about economic rationalism and as a result, democratic capitalism leads to peace. According to Schumpeter, no democracy would pursue the minority interest, war profiteers and the elite, and tolerate the high costs associated with imperialism. Minorities like monopolists would encourage imperial expansion to gain access to more markets, but rational citizens would not allow this to be pursued. He has three main pacifist assumptions: there is no room for non-economic objectives for individuals, there is no room for non-economic objectives for states, and that world politics are homogenized.

Machievelli’s argument greatly differs from Schumpeter as he believes republics are not pacifistic. He contents that republics are actually the best mode of expansionism. Liberty associated with the free republic encourages increased population and property. He believes that citizens are all, in effect, trying to dominate others despite the facts that their goals are diverse.

Kant’s view of liberal internationalism stresses the belief that liberal states have created a peace among themselves. He believes perpetual peace will occur with a republic guided by a constitution, the formation of alliances between free states, and cosmopolitan law. Kant believes that cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. In his opinion, the market removes decisions of production and distribution from the realm of the state. Kant believes the interconnectedness of these characteristics will help sustain liberal peace.

I think there is merit to each argument. I believe that these arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive; within the international system, liberalism can bring about peace, imperialism, and international agreements in different states. I can understand how capitalism and democracy can facilitate peace, but I also see how it has fostered competition and conquest, both militarily and economically.

Doyle Article

Doyle's article challenges the theory of a democratic peace. The well established theory between politicians and scholars has been that democratic societies don't wage war against each other, and thus are more peaceful. Those who support this view point claim that this lack of war makes liberal democracies the ideal form of government, and often have statistics of past wars to back up their ideas. However Doyle introduces Kant's idea that while liberal democracies tend to have a separate peace with each other, they still can and have acted aggressively towards other states in the past. Kant believes that because non-republics are not representative of a whole population, republics fear them and their actions. When a state is governed by one man or one group and not the populous, a democracy thinks that they have a right to interfere in their affairs, as they are not interfering in the rights of a state, but in one man's ideals.
Kant's theory can be applied in particular to one work of fiction, West Side Story. In between all the dancing and singing there is a significant political agenda being played out in the streets of New York City. The Sharks are a group that is more or less represented by one man, Bernardo. The Jets are the local gang, in which there is more democracy; the ideas of all gang members are heard and listened to (and danced to), not just their leader Riff's. The Jets are the republic who fear the non-republic and their one-man-interests. The rest of the Sharks might not want a gang war with the Jets, but it is only Bernardo's views that matter. Riff and the rest of the Jets thus give the Sharks no rights that belong to most states, as the will of the entire group is not represented. The Jets go and accost Bernardo in what is considered neutral territory, the gymnasium, a place where no gang is allowed to operate as a group. In the international system, this would surely be similar to an invasion of sovereignty, a move a liberal democracy wouldn't make against another democracy. There is also no direct reference to the Jets fighting against other, more democratic gangs like themselves (except the desire to be "the best gang on the street"). Kant also states that these wars fought between republics and non-republics often do more damage than not, but both sides still agree to enter into the fight. Tony dies, Bernardo dies, and Riff dies, making everyone regret their loss of life. But both sides still decided to engage in a gang war, which they knew could have disastrous consequences.
It's true that the singing and dancing and the references to Romeo and Juliet slightly disrupt this analysis, but Kant's point on which Doyle focuses is nonetheless represented. He states that liberal democracies have a separate peace amongst themselves, but not in relation to dictatorship states. They fear these states (as the Jets did the Sharks) because one man overrides the voice of the people, making their actions erratic at times. Everything can be found in West Side Story, as if Kant was a Broadway aficionado all along.

Kay & the role of NATO [Yoo, Week 3, Substantive]

Kay's article brought up some interesting points regarding NATO's role in the war in Kosovo.

I found it particularly interesting that NATO's act of war in Kosovo violated a basic principle of inernational law as codified in the United Nations. The Charter of the UN states that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force for the kind of humanitarian campaign that NATO waged. Not only that, the members of NATO were going against even the core principles of their own institution, stating that member states must "refrain from the use of force in any manner i nconsistent with the purpose of the UN."

I think Emily makes a good point about how the NATO does not appear to have a purpose in today's world. Especially, I question the NATO's principle of "collective defense". I feel that collective defense is a rather outdated policy where the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar. As Emily, I question the purpose of NATO as an institution. However, I wonder why NATO is expanding to an even greater extent, with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I wonder, who exactly are NATO members defending themselve against?

Kay Response

Kay's discussion of NATO's response to the Serbian attacks in Kosovo brought up a lot of interesting points regarding the impact of international institutions on the ability to wage war, as well as their overall impact. In this specific case, Kay asserts that the United States would have waged war against the Serbians in one way or another, whether NATO or the UN was on board or not, and would have probably been more efficient on its own. Due to the bureaucratic nature of NATO, everything was handled wrong.

Using this example to demonstrate the role that international institutions play in the ability to wage war is not entirely fair because, as Kay mentioned, it is an institution without a purpose. It was created in a different world with a different set of problems. During the Cold War when there was a bipolar world, NATO was an alliance between the United States and its Western European allies. NATO is now trying to place itself in a new role in which it does not belong and thus does not fill that role effectively.

Kay was correct in saying "the result is that the key scholarly question may not be NATO's adaptation, but rather what institutional form is best suited to replace NATO." Neoliberalism cannot fully be criticized by NATO's deficiency now. Rather, if NATO ever was a well functioning institution then it proves that international institutions can play a positive role in world politics, and the fact that it failed to transition with the ever-shifting international order is a separate issue. Kay said that "the legacy of the Kosovo war has been a rapid decline in the relevance of NATO for its most important member, the United States and for some European allies now prioritizing the European Union." If NATO declines as it's ineffectiveness becomes clear in order to make way for other more effective institutions then it is a good sign for the neoliberalism. It would help to prove that international institutions exist for a real purpose and have a real impact, but if NATO continues exist without purpose then it will hard to make the case for a neoliberal point of view.

An analysis of Schumpeter, Machiavelli and Kant via Doyle

The basis for Schumpeter's argument was the "interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism." To prove his theory, he demonstrated that the arrival of capitalism and democracy over imperialism has led to unwarlike dispositions and a lack of forcible expansion, and therefore, more pacifism through the pursuit of common material interests. A few of his points, however, seem debatable (aside from those already pointed out by Doyle). First, he defines imperialism as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion," claiming that the private interests of imperialists have no larger objective on the national level. This makes a rather large assumption that private monarchical and militaristic attitudes do not include survival of the state as their first priority (a largely national objective). Without the survival of the state, private interests could not be pursued. He also claims that “the least feudal, most capitalist society – the US – has demonstrated the least imperialistic tendencies.” It could be easily argued against that the US portrays extremely imperialistic tendencies, from the days of the Monroe doctrine, to imperialistic actions in the Philippines, to even the Iraq invasion of 2003. The US has traditionally sought to expand its control on a localized and even global scale by acting as a global policing power. Schumpeter also reasserts his claim that capitalist democracy “steadily tells against the use of military force and peaceful arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the side of war.” Schumpeter’s strict definition of force as war or warlike tendencies is also lacking depth. Even today, military force is used to create peaceful situations (for example, the current war in Iraq), or the threat of military force, even in international institutions, can be used to maintain existing peaceful situations (such as the UN Peacekeeping force in Sudan). Schumpeter’s definition of force must be expanded to encompass these aspects of force to truly be able to defend pacifism in capitalist democracies. Although the examples I have listed deal with governments of mixed political dispositions, I agree with Doyle’s assertion that Schumpeter must further address the variety in world and state politics, without simply assuming that evolution towards democracy and capitalism is inevitable for all countries.

Another point I wanted to bring up refers to Doyle’s analysis of Machiavelli’s Liberal Imperialism. Machiavelli asserts that republics are the best form of guaranteeing state survival, and that they can be “characterized by social equality, popular liberty and political participation.” He also says that “we are lovers of glory” and that we seek to rule or avoid being oppressed, and so “necessity – political survival – calls for expansion.” The concept of expansion, however, even if it is supported by liberal motivations, portrays the importance of relative gains, a realist motivation. I find Machiavelli’s description a bit conflicting in the sense that imperialism is (as Schumpeter would also put it) “antithetical” to liberal theories.

An overall critique I have of Kant’s Liberal Internationalism is that even given his three “definitive articles” of peace, he is far too idealistic in assuming that man can act ethical and in accordance with all values, including his own, at all times. Situations are complex, and what is ethical is not always what can be done. People also take shortcuts and make mistakes that prevent them from acting as they should – it’s a part of human nature. He also fails to consider that some values can be fundamentally contradictory and does not address actors that have fully internalized some of these contradictions, such as fundamentalist terrorist groups. Countries cannot be fully hospitable towards these stateless actors because true intention can never be fully know – it is an internal thought. Also, ethics are never the only influencing factor in a situation, and until they are, Kant’s theory is merely a prediction that cannot be proved.

The Czech Example

In class, we discussed that France and England's refusal to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia when Hitler was going to occupy parts of it is a good example of realist theory, but if one considers the event from another angle then it could be argued that this same event actually goes against realist theory. Hitler was threatening to disrupt the balance of power in the continent of Europe in an aggressive and obvious way, but due to economic domestic problems and the memories of the World War I, the most powerful states in the continent chose appeasement and thus allowed Germany to expand to the powerful force that it would soon come to be. France and England were more concerned with internal problems than the problem of maintaining their position in the world.

Realist Dialogue

While most would like to think that in the future there will be some sort of international system that could control all states and entities in a balance of peace, the Realists have come to accept that this is just not a possibility. One of the key tenets of Realism that I would have to agree with is the importance of international anarchy. Though today we now have the UN to hint at rules and regulations for the states; it is more important for a state to look out for itself. Especially regarding the extreme differing cultures, economic standings, and numerous other points, it would be impossible for all states to agree on international rules for every aspect of the political and economic system.

Domestic Policies and Realism

Someone brought up the point in class that domestic policies have a dramatic effect on a nation's foreign policy. This is the key element of a series of flaws that realism simply cannot provide for with its take on the international system. As the debate rages on in America about whether the War in Iraq is truly a matter of national security or simply a large waste of lives and resources, we may very well have a president and Congress in 2008 who are willing to break back our troops from that theater. Will it be because everyone suddenly realized that the War isn't in our vested interests and doesn't pertain to our Fundamental Continuity or Physical Survival? No, it will be because the domestic politics of our country would be changed with a new election. Every party brings its own separate views to the table and every new election can bring a change in a country's views of the international system. I feel this is just one of the many factors that realism doesn't take into account, making it a slightly flawed theory (though not altogether useless).

Continuing the Ethical Debate From Class

Political realism denies the impact of morality on governing state actors. However, ethics must be a part of International Relations for the world to coexist. Ethics and International Relations cannot be segregated. Yet realism relies on the design that humans are not necessarily inherently good. This is because there is no universal definition of good-natured. But relative morals can be defined by one’s background: religion, family, socio-economic status, education, political affiliation, even the literature one read as a child. These affect your personal set of morals, which is always aligned with your motives, whether externally regarded as good or evil. Especially in a democracy, leaders act on the behalf of those who elected him/her to power. People are moral animals, even when acting instinctively. If a leader acts on power instincts (in accordance to realist thought) they may not necessarily be acting for the greater good of their people. Self-sufficiency may not be as effective as dependency, which has been proven to lead to security, the medal of realism. Following this progression of logic, realism can negate democracy, the institution it is recognized to protect.

What is a state? [Yoo, Week 2, Dialogue]

Although I agree with Agata's assessment of Greg's definition, I think of "State" as much more complicated than simply "a political entity under a unified government within a set of distinct boundaries." I would like to point out that the boundaries seen in much of Africa and Asia today are the result of European colonization. The Great Powers divided up the land in spheres of influence without regards to traditional boundaries or ethnic groups. For example, in Afghanistan only 44% of the population belong to the dominant ethnic group. Not only that, the dominant group is scattered not only in Afghanistan, but other states as well. Countries that feature multiple ethnic groups will always be challenged in maintaining order, especially with the onslaught of nationalism. I believe a state to be only valid and legitimate only if the state has somehow surpressed, assimilated, or encompassed everybody within the border. Therefore, I feel the definition of "state" is much more complicated than what we perceive it to be.

A continuation of class discussions

Towards the end of class, an interesting question was brought up: what is the definition of a state? My answer to this question is simple. It is a political entity under a unified government within a set of distinct boundaries. Greg raised the point in class that the definition of a state depends on the type of government, that in the US, the population as a whole is a major component of political power within the state, but within a state such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the people do not have much of a say, and are therefore not a component of the state. Whereas this is a good point, I think that this is more of a definition of what the political organization of state is, and not what a state is itself.

Another critique, which we discussed in our group in class, was Morgenthau’s criticism of motive in predicting the foreign policy actions of statesmen. Initially we though that his criticism was faulty in that power itself is the fundamental motive for action in the realist school of thought. What we eventually came to believe, however, was that Morgenthau meant that since you can never truly know the intent hidden within the mind of a statesman from the statements he makes to the public, motives are irrelevant in an empirical analysis of foreign policy. Morgenthau claims, however, that “intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, as well as […] political ability to translate what [has been] comprehended into successful political action” is important in understanding foreign policy. It is ironic that he disregards motive. In his attempt to explain why states act the way they do, Morgenthau judges success by level of power. Isn’t this simply making the assumption that the ultimate motive, the ultimate reason for action, when stripped to its basics, is power itself?

Grieco- Week 2 Substantive

Grieco’s critique of neoliberal institutionalism was more so a resounding stamp of approval for realism.

New liberal institutionalists argue that international institutions can help states cooperate. Neoliberal theory suggests that states with common political, economic, and military interests will be more likely to have political-economic cooperation. They agree with realists that anarchy impedes cooperation in the global system, but believe realists dramatically overemphasize conflict and the fail to give credit to institutions for their ability to promote cooperation between states. Neoliberalism suggests states seek to achieve maximum absolute gains and are indifferent to other states’ gains. They note states “cheating” in the system can potentially be a threat but contend new institutions eliminate that threat. These institutions are a stronghold of the international system. Other key actors include labor unions, interest groups, political parties, MNCs, and transgovernmental organizations.

Realists, on the other hand, believe that even among states with shared interests, the lack of a governing central authority fosters conflict and competition between states Realism, opposed to neoliberal institutionalism, does a far better job of addressing the issues of conflict and competition. According to Grieco, this means that realism is the most powerful theory of international politics.

Realists believe states are rational actors whose motives and actions are shaped by anarchy. In their point of view, states are preoccupied with the ideas of power and security. States are unwilling to cooperate because it may result in losing independence or security. Realists are also pessimistic about cooperation because they believe a state needs to focus not just on absolute gains but also maintaining a small gap in gains that are favorable for their partners. Due to the fact that realists address the uncertainties and risks of others actors, Grieco believe that realism provides a more comprehensive theory of the problem of cooperation than neoliberal institutionalism.

Although I agree with the majority of points in Grieco’s argument, I am reluctant to consider new liberal institutionalism as a void theory in international politics. The current international system and power structure encourages states to act in their own self-interest. If the costs of acting in such a manner ultimately began to dramatically hurt states, I believe states would begin to focus more on their absolute gains and less on the gap between gains from the respective partners.

Carr

Carr explains that there are three different spheres of political power (military, economic, and power over opinion). He states, “…That these categories are closely interdependent; and though they are theoretically separable, it is difficult in practice to imagine a country for any length of time possessing one kind of power in isolation from the others.” While Carr goes on to explain the three spheres of power, it becomes evident that while political economics and public opinion are important to political power, all three are ultimately linked to military power and the fact that war is central to international relations. Every action the state takes is usually somehow directed toward the aspect of war or prevention of war.

Carr goes on to state that, “Military power, being an essential element in the life of the state, becomes not only an instrument, but an end in itself.” Wars are no longer for the sole purpose of increasing the size of an empire by trade or territory, but are instead used as a means to prevent other countries from gaining more military power; or as Carr put it, “…there is much justification for the epigram that ‘the principal cause of war is war itself.’” Even wars that usually start as wars for security or other purposes usually end up becoming wars for the acquisition of more power.

I also agree with Carr that as soon as a nation attains some little bit of power, their appetite for power grows; it is simply human nature. This is just as Machiavelli claimed that, “Men never appear to themselves to possess securely what they have unless they acquire something further from another.” And in today’s international politics, it is apparent that in order to adequately enforce one’s foreign and even domestic politics, a certain level of military power is required. Without the brute force to back up one’s policies, nobody would have to follow such policies; which was exactly what happened with the failure of the League of Nations in the 1950s.

Carr Article [Yoo, Week 2, Substantive]

After reading Carr's article, I did some googling about the League of Nations. Specifically, I wanted to know more about the League because of Carr's suggestion that it failed because of power politics. I wanted to give myself a reminder of the w's of the League, and the content of the time period. A small detail I found intriguing was that the members of the League were unable to agree on even a symbol or flag for the institution. What a way to illegitimate a "global" institution! I thought this detail neatly packaged exactly what Carr was suggesting throughout his article; Power politics play a dominant role in international relations. States primarily focus on gaining, or at least preventing the loss, of their power.
Going off tangent, but for some reason I am reminded of the LEFT BEHIND book series by evangelical writers Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins. In case you haven't heard of them, they are a series of books about the Tribulation. Millions and millions of people vanish because of the Rapture, and the people remaining on Earth are left asking themselves what the hell happened. In the midst of this, a world government is formed. The "Global Community" becomes the prime center of power, and surprisingly the people of the world accept it, hoping for peace. Of course, not everybody is. World War III occurs because the American president finds it unacceptable to hand over a majority chunk of arms to the GC government. The war ends with a GC victory. The GC becomes a legitimate government, with the arms, soldiers, and funds to actually carry out what it wishes to do. A single world religion is formed, and the world is united under a single leader, the Antichrist at that.
After reading Carr's article, I think a world government like the GC is definitely impossible without a huge change in how our world is constructed. The dramatic events in the LEFT BEHIND series could only occur because of such a thing as the Rapture. In order for there to be consensus between all states, each state must give up some of its power. So will there ever be a world government? I guess only a Rapture can answer that question.

Grieco

Grieco makes an interesting point about neoliberals and their acceptance of certain realist principles. He states "Hegemonic power may be necessary to establish cooperation among states, neoliberals argue, but it may endure after hegemony with the aid of institutions." With the decline of the US as a hegemonic power and the rise of other states and actors such as the EU, it will be interesting to see whether or not this argument will hold true. Past periods of transition, which had no apparent hegemonic powers, have always been associated with periods of instability and war. With all of the international organizations established under the period of US hegemony, whether political, economic or social, it will be interesting to see whether or not the neoliberal theory holds up in this new context.

On the same note, I think that Grieco should take greater consideration of context. His largest argument in his article circles around the hypocrisy of the neoliberal acceptance of realist principles and he continues to list competing fundamental hypothesis based on these theories. What he forgets, however, is that decisions and the reasoning behind them are never black and white. There are many external factors that influence decisions on the durability of arrangements, number of partners, etc. States act differently under different pressures, just as politics within a state can swing from left to right over a period of time. It may be that in accepting some realist values and the inconsistency of motives and decisions, the neoliberal argument may actually be closer to reality.

carr and the roll or propoganda in power politics

Carr said that "the issue is no longer whether men shall be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but subjecation to the influence of innumberable forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another." This statement gives propoganda a large role in power politics, although he disproves it, later saying that "absolute power over opinion...is limited by the necessity of some measure of conformity with fact" and "by the inherent utopianism of human nature." If these two limits are legitimate, then it is clear that at least to a certain extent, no amount of propoganda can negate freedom of opinion.

As Carr says himself, education is a necessary tool of propoganda, but freedom of thought inevitably follows education, as well. In Carr's discussion of "the necessity of some measure of comformity with fact," people will be much less likely to believe propoganda when the propoganda is no longer serving their needs. A good example of this is America's reaction to both the war in Vietnam and Iraq. As death toll's rise and wars extend, people will be less likely to listen to war propoganda. Thus in America, propoganda cannot control the media for an extended period time, and new forms of media hurt the ability for the state to produce propoganda rather than help it like Carr argues, especially the internet because it is easy to access a contrary point of view.

Perhaps there is more of a threat of lack of public opinion in more totalitarian states, but in such a connected world, even highly controlled countries are able to see past their own countries propoganda. During the Cold War, communist parts of Europe saw how they were lagging behind their neighbors. Further, Carr says that "human beings do in the long run reject the doctrine that makes might right." Government's cannot oppress people for an extended period of time without experience a rejection of propoganda and a manifestation of discontent, whether they can control that discontent or not. Despite Carr's initial claim about propoganda's role in determining the opinion of the masses, propoganda's role in power politics is fickle and limited.

The Hypocrisy of Realism

Morgenthau describes political realism essentially as “interest defined as power.” Realism is based on an anarchic state system that is governed on objective laws at the root of human nature. Classical realists assume that humans are greedy, power hungry and resourceful animals acting on the Darwinian platform of hegemonic dominance. The state system, according to Morgenthau’s realist, is effectively governed by actors of power politics who seek soft and hard leverage over other actors to ensure their survival. However, motives always play a key role in policy making; Churchill acted on personal and nationalistic motives in office and before World War I when he switched His Majesty’s Navy to oil power, deepening the power of Great Britain and his pocket. If realists act instinctively and rationally on their will to survive, they are unarguably acting on behalf of their motives or the motives of their people. Morgenthau states, “To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data…History shows no correlation between the history of motives and the history of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.” Perhaps policy is determined without regard to morality, but motives are intrinsic in every societal interaction, in accordance with realist perspective which assumes humans are greedy and power hungry.
A tenet of realism is the existence of an anarchic international state system. But within the boundaries of realist thought, this is also hypocritical. The pursuit of dominance in realism negates anarchy. Soft power global dominance to ensure order, protection and survival is the utopia of realist thought. However, the ability of a state to control the global stage through any means (economically, militarily, etc.) is a form of an international system of control: the antithesis of anarchy.

Grieco Article

While I feel that Grieco has a well-articulated and researched position with a certain amount of logic behind it, I find his argument over paranoid. Perhaps it is my own personal distaste for power politics, but his defense of some aspects of realism is something I disagree with. His main claim is that neoliberals only focus on the overall gain of their own country and not of the potentially greater gains of other countries. So if these other countries (even if they are staunch allies) have greater gains and wish to wage war on your country, you are in deep trouble because you didn't pay attention before when they had greater gains than you're nation. Realists are skeptical of the advantages gained by their allies. That means in today's world a US realist politician would be wary of anything the UK did to advanced its power, even though they are one of our greates allies.
To further enhance my criticism of this argument I will draw upon the writings of JRR Tolkien's epic triology The Lord of the Rings (it said in the syllabus we could connect things to movies if we wanted). Those unfamilar with the The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers and The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King should know that there are two main nations fighting for the world men against the evil darkness of Sauron, being Rohan and Gondor. Rohan fights a major battle against an ally of Sauron in 'The Two Towers' and is recuperating within it's own borders when Gondor calls for military assistance to fight a battle with Sauron's armies at it's own border. At first Theoden, King of Rohan is skeptical, claiming that once Gondor (the mightiest nation in Middle Earth) has borne the brunt of the fighting then his own nation will be the most powerful. But is this any way to think when facing down the forces of darkness? Rohan was worried about the relative gain at first, its gain by comparison. But after some convincing from Gandalf the wizard, Theoden agrees to go to Gondor's aid and help fight the forces of evil.
Now, perhaps this is not the best example, but it came to my mind as well-suiting Grieco's point. I'm not saying states shouldn't worry about how much the power of other states is changing, but it seems paranoid at times to always worry about what allies are doing. If Rohan hadn't come to Gondor's aid, perhaps Sauron's armies could have trampled both nation's forces seperately, even if Rohan would have fared a little better in the end. JRR Tolkien didn't write this ending, but his books do have clear parallels to world affairs at the turn of the 20th century, so perhaps Grieco should pick up a fantasy novel instead of a history textbook.

The Dialects of World Order: Theory and Perspective

Through the synthetic analysis of historical interdisciplinary theories, Alker and Beirsteker effectively analyze the global political system as conflicting in theory, yet alternatively descriptive of their relative historical and social context. Emerging in the twentieth-century, characterized by anti-capitalist schools of thought, political disorder, war and subsequent recessive liberalism, three definitive interdisciplinary approaches to theoretical international relations form which encompass traditional, dialectical and behavioral scientific approaches. Since each is theoretical and scientific, they are scrutinized in practice and against each other. However, the point of this research is to realize the importance of the modern social scientific research traditions which derive each theory and to attach significance to how each inhabited the twentieth-century. It is important to note that international theory is created in relation to region, time and political orientation, and that cross-culture analyzing proves bias results and only catalyzes disorder. This type of analysis impedes politics to transcend the boundaries of theory into practice and establish any sort of international order. The Dialects of World Order was also refreshing because it classified broad international theories and attached practical significance to each one.

First Class Discussion

I found the portion of the class discussion about the evolution of the modern state system and applying the rules of evolution to countries particularly interesting on Thursday. We discussed how that in Europe, the order evolved in order to maximize efficiency, economic success, and security. Despite the natural aspect of the state systems evolution in Europe, this system did not evolve naturally in the rest of the world. Imperialism, globalization, and a general Western interest in the rest of the world led to the rest of the world division into states even though for many states it is not culturally or economically practical. The obvious example is Africa, which was divided haphazardly and the many cases of the civil war within African states can at least partially be traced to the very non-evolutionary that they came into being.

Agata made a lot of really good points about the EU, and I agree with her argument. I am divided in my thinking about how naturally that the EU evolved. I agree that the EU makes more sense as an economic entity, rather than a political one, and that member states must feel the same after the Constitution failed to be accepted. It makes sense that small states in Europe would join together because it is difficult for them to compete on an international scale against U.S., China, etc. At the same time, the fact that Europe felt the economic need to come together does not mean the rest of the world is going to follow the same trend because other countries do not have this same need. If countries do come together then it should be out of mutual need, not because the EU at least appears fairly successful.

Alker Article Impressions. [Yoo, Week 1, Substantive & Dialogue]

Alker and Biersteker take a rather post-modern stance when it comes to studying IR theories. In the paper, the authors propose that there is no single IR research theory that has gained world-wide acceptance and hegemony.
Essentially, the world is a disorderly place, especially due to the "century of total war" in the 20th century. IR theories attempt to make sense of this disorder. Yet, these theories widely vary from national setting to setting. For example, in the United States IR debates have focused on traditional vs. behavior approaches, while dialectical approaches dominated the Soviet Union.
In class, we learned about how every day practices and IR theory are interconnected. I interpreted the lecture as being that every day practices can have a great impact on IR policies because the small things people do and feel mold their beliefs. It seems only natural that people's beliefs shape their view of the world, and exert influences on relationships between different states. Also, 'every day practices' are more than simply about 'small things'. I view every day practices as emcompassing a wide variety of human characteristics, as whether one is male or female, where one lives, whether one attends church or temple or not at all, etc. Cultural differences can have a huge impact on IR policy. I agree with Alker and Biersteker in that we need to take into account these variables in order to have a better understanding of IR policies internationally. We cannot assume our ideals are that of others, and that the world state system evolved into its current state due American-centric theories.
However, I agree with Dave that Marxism and communism take a less active role in world politics than it did in the past. Today's world is composed of centralized states with defined borders. There are only about a 190 'states' around the world, and diplomacy is handled between states and not 'nations'. With this in mind, I think the current debates between traditional and behavioral science approaches are more useful. There are still states that are stuck in the Soviet Union model, such as that of North Korea. I do not support ignoring these states, but they generally take a miniscule part in world politics. They are based on failed models of world order. Why focus on an outdated system?
In class, we learned about the evolution of how the modern state system became to be. Especially, the belief that modern states can more effectively deal with the world environment really appealed to me. I feel that if states adapted to become the most efficient system, than IR theories have to adapt to the times as well. As Dave pointed out, globalization is the standard in our state-centric world. Which theories are best at explaining the world? Not radical/Marxist dialectical approaches, I think.

Hayward Article

One thing that can't be overlooked when taking the Hayward Article into regard is the fact that it was written in 1984. It keeps making the point that IR is about more than just the realist, traditional appraoches put forth by the US and that behavior and Marxist thinking is something that can't be overlooked. While I do agree with the notion that IR is more complex than any traditional thinking, the fact that Marxism and communism might have a larger role in predicting the state system is a little far-fetched.
Ever since the downfall of the USSR, globalization has taken over as the new economic force on the planet. The USSR tried to stop the forces of capitalism in its region of the world, but with it's collapse global capitalism has swept across borders, bringing the world closer to one single market without tariffs. Lower communication and travel costs plus the Information Revolution mean that only a few bastions of communism and dictatorships still exist. Now, whether globalization is a positive force outside the economic realm or not is another matter altogether, but it has to be considered when talking about today's international system. Whether trying to predict future events, trying to critique civil injustices, or examine everyday events, this is the 21st century (forgive the expression, but it's appropriate). That's why I just can't take an article that still mentions "Cold Warriors" in the present tense with any real significance. Just look how far the world has come in the next twenty years.